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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will aim to explore the relationship between the battle of Dithakong 
and 'mfecane' theory in connection with the growing critique led by Julian 
Cobbing. Essentially, it will be argued that certain aspects of 'mfecane' theory 
appear in fact tenable, with particular reference to the upheavals west of the 
Drakensberg in the years 1822-4, as the thesis seeks to establish the original 
version of events at Dithakong. 
Ever since Cobbing has questioned the fundamental tenets of 'mfecane' theory 
and suggested rather that the destabilizations within black society during the 
1820's sprang from European penetration, there have been efforts to give his 
ideas academic credibility. Dithakong is one key event within the 'mfecane' 
diaspora that has been attempted to be explained without reference to African 
agency. Julian Cobbing, Jurg Richner and Jan-Bart Gewald have presented these 
alternative analyses which, although similar in broader intention, are distinct in 
detailed explanation. 
Whereas in the past, Dithakong has been viewed as a defensive battle against the 
threatening advance of a numerous and destitute 'mfecane' migratory group, the 
latest versions interpret the events in terms of a raid on an unprovoked and 
unaggressive people. Although noting the advances made by Cobbing and others, 
it will be argued that with regard to Dithakong their analyses are forced and 
suited to meet the respective demands of their larger suppositions, which 
ultimately brings their singular Eurocentric theory of violence into question. To 
this end, certain elements within 'mfecane' theory require to be reconsidered. 
The opening chapters of the thesis will focus on Dithakong itself. All the 
revisionist analyses show extreme scepticism towards the eyewitness narratives of 
the events and pay little attention to the reports about the 'Mantatee horde.' It 
will be suggested that such an approach is unwarranted and that a correct 
understanding of the 'Mantatee' would validate the original accounts. 
The closing chapter will address the broader implications of Dithakong, with 
particular reference to the upheavals west of the Drakensberg. Th.e thesis does 
not propose a complete return to the traditional 'mfecane' model, but rather 
offers a synthesis approach whereby the conflicts are viewed as a complex 
-interplay of 'European' and Afrocentric forces. It is hoped that such an approach 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, the dominant theoretical model used to explain developments in 
the interior of early nineteenth-century southern Africa has been a cluster of ideas 
, , centred around the 'mfecane'. This 'mfecane' theory, the creation of a number of 
historians, describes an era of history, particularly the 1820's, when vast regions _ 
of the interior of southern Africa were thrust into i~mense upheaval, 
characterised _by numerq1:1_s _ ~~nfl_ic~~ aD:d _ population _ mjgrati2ns. In essence, 
'mfecane' theory has proposed an ~rocentric interpretation of the events._Earliest 
· writers emphasized the cat~_<:_lysmic black-on-black destructiy~_g3:t_u~e of the period 
that was, in the end, the ~esult of the 'Zulu-cen_tric' re~olution under Shaka.1 
Over time, the concept of the 'mfecane' has steadily grown in dimension and 
" 
content, so that today it constitutes a macro-theory around which the history of 
' ~ 
the early nineteenth-century interior has been written. Since the intervention of 
J.D. Omer-Cooper in the 1960's, 'mfecane' theory has come to encompass a 
which began __!r_o_~ a single centre and a~~ected extensive areas ~f so_u!h-~e!_lt!al. 
"-
1See for example: G.M. Theal, History of South Africa, Cape Town reprint, 1964, 5, 
pp.428-456; G.E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, Cape Town reprint, 1965, 2, pp.230-
239; G.W. Stow, The Native Races of South Africa, London, 1905, pp.460-487 (Although 
Theal, Stow and Cory do not use the term 'mfecane', their view of the upheavals is 
similar to those who later referred to the concept); D.F. Ellenberger, History of the 
Basuto, London, 1912, pp.137-236; W. Macmillan, Bantu. Boer. and Briton, London, 
1929, pp.14-18; E. Walker, A History of South Africa, 3rd. edition, London, 1964, 
pp.175, 176. 
2 
Africa.2 Present 'mfecane' theory has been developed to such a degree that it has 
been regarded as established fact of southern African history. A number of 
dominant common features may be identified in the way 'mfecane' theory has 
recently been expressed. Firstly, the in.Wal motors of violence have been described 
in terms of an i~ernally self-generated revolution ~m~ngst the norther~ ~guni,_ 
with particular reference to the rise of the Zulu nation under Shaka. Forces 
behind the processes of socio-political transformation and consolidation have been 
explained in terms of environ_mental influ~nces, overpopulation and the 
possibilities of ivory trading. Secondly, the ~gression of Shaka and the Zulu is 
seen to have brought the d~placement of neighbou~i!lg African communities, who, 
in turn, themselves dislocated other commun~!~ in a period of intensive 
deprivation and formidable strife. It is believed that these violent reactions 
affected much of sub-continental Africa. Thirdly, not only did this period of 
immense upheaval cause the depopulation of the interi~r, but, positively, it is 
considered to have brought the conso~idation and state formation of a number of 
African societies at the time of the arrival of the Europeans into the region.3 
' ,a_ 
'-.) ~~ 2J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, London, 1966. 
3See for example: J. Guy, 'Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu 
kingdom', in S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial 
South Africa, London, 1980, pp.102-119; A.K. Smith, 'Delagoa Bay and the trade of 
south-eastern Africa', in R. Gray and D. Birmingham (eds.), Pre-Colonial African Trade, 
London, 1970, pp.265-289; P. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, 
Cambridge, 1983, ch.2; J.B. Peires (ed.), Before and After Shaka, Grahamstown, 1979; 
W.F. Lye, 'The Difaqane: The Mfecane in the Southern Sotho Area, 1822-24', Journal 
of African History, 8, 1967, pp.107-131. 
3 
Over the last decade, Julian Cobbing has presented a number of papers re-
examining the fundamental . tenets of 'mfecane' theory.4 Cobbing ·, questi9ns 
whether the 'mfecane' ever occurred in this sense, and has offered the polemic 
that the 'destabilizations and transformations within black society rather sprang 
from the synchronous and converging impact of European penetration at Delagoa 
Bay, the Cape, north of the Orange and Natal.'5 Cobbing argues that the 
'mfecane' has been invented as myth and as alibi to conceal 'European' atrocities 
in the seizure of land and labour. The expansion of European capitalism, he 
suggests, in terms of Portugese slavers from Delagoa Bay, colonial forces from the 
eastern frontier, and renegade European and Griqua slavers in the Orange River 
region, was the primary causative factor of violence. 
Ever since Cobbing has challenged the prevailing notions, there have been efforts 
both by himself and his students to establish his thesis and give his.ideas academic 
credibility. Key events within the :mfecane' diaspora have been identified and 
e~plained in terms of the larger suppositions of 'European' expansionism and 
lab()'!J'.ciemands, 3:nd withol;lt. referen~~ to African agents involved in a process of 
violent chain reactions and population migrations precipitated by Zulu 
4J. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane', unpubl. seminar paper, University of 
Cape Town, 1983; 'The case against the mfecane', unpubl. paper, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1984; 'The myth of the mfecane', unpubl. paper, University of Durban-
Westville, 1987; 'Jettisoning the mfecane (with perestroika)', University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1988; 'The mfecane as alibi: thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', 
Journal of African History, 29, 1988, pp.487-519. 
5Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane (with perestroika)', p.1. 
4 
. expansionism in the east. 
Cobbing has rightly criticised the pervading Afrocentricism of 'mfecane' theory to 
the extent of denying attention to 'European' aggression, and his critique has 
initiated the possibilities for an exciting<re-examination of early nineteenth-century 
southern African history. However, his determination to replace 'mfecane' theory 
with his co:inter-paradigm of 'European' penetration as basis, has provided a 
corresponding barrier with respect to the historiography of the era. Ultimately, his 
view of the creation of the 'mfecane' has become as Eurocentric as 'mfecane' 
theory is Afrocentric. 
By focusing on the events at Dithakong on 25-27 June 1823, the thesis will aim 
to expose the poverty of Cobbing's singular Eurocentric theory of violence, as it 
seeks to contribute a more suitable framework for research in the area. Dithakong 
is one such._case study that stands at a critical juncture for Cobbing's ideas with 
particular respect to the ~~ains of violence west of the Drakensberg and, 
consequently, there have been a range of interpretations of Dithakong that display 
these similar broader intentions.6 
6Julian Cobbing began this re-examination in 'The mfecane as alibi'. Further critiques 
have been forwarded by students who at some time have worked under Cobbing. See J. 
Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane": or a change of paradigm', unpubl. B.A. 
Hons. essay, Rhodes University, 1988, pp.7-10; J.B. Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as 
Mantatees: a critical reassessment of events leading up to the battle of Dithakong', M.A. 
thesis, Rijks Universiteit Leiden, 1990. 
5 
In the past, the _Yaal-Caledon region,. ~est of the Drakensberg, has been 
described as having been devastated by numerous African . 'hordes! who 
themselves were generated westwards by African agents east of the Drakensberg, 
in the years 1822-3. These '~ordes', in tum, dislocated whole communities in the 
Vaal-Caledon region, displacing a number of -societies onto the highv~ld, some as 
far afield as Lake Victoria. Since few literate reporters h,ad penetrated this area 
by 1823, there were .few eyewitness accounts recorded with respect to the nature 
of the events at the moment of the upheavals. However, the occurrences at 
. Dithakong stand as one key exception with the eyewitness narratives of three 
,Europeans. Situated on the highveld, on the western fringe of the Vaal-Caledon 
region of what has been termed the 'blank unknown space' of the early 
nineteenth-century interior, Dithakong constitutes a locality of surer empirical 
ground and provides an important source towards unlocking the nature o.f the 
chains of violenc~ west of the Drakensberg. 
Up until the present, Dithakong has been viewed as a defensive battle against the 
threatening advance of a vast and destitute 'mfecane' migratory group. However, 
the latest versions interpret the events in terms of a slave and cattle raid on an 
unprovoked and unaggressive people. These analyses have obviously not been 
arrived at independently or in isolation, but need to be considered as a whole in 
relation to the Cobbing thesis. By describing the events in terms of a penetrative 
raid, the revisionists attempt to situate Dithakong in terms of the !abour demands 
of the colony and within the destabilizations integral to the Transorangian region 
.r 
' "\ ; . ( . ~- - 6 
itself, unrelated to African agency from the east. The ~rces of change, which 
supposedly -~use_d _ t_he de~truction of African communities, as is alleged was the 
case at Dithakong, are identified as renegade ~~~pean and Griqua ~lavers, the 
£~~runners Of_J?uropean ~apitalism i!1 the area to the north of the Orange River. 
In essence, the thesis aims to reveal the con~~Lv~~-~~~!~2f.~~~ ~evisionist analy_~~ 
of Dithakong. The work primarily involves a critical evaluation of their 
methodology, which necessitates a close historiographical review of the available 
\.s ;-" .. :'tontemporary sources. Since the empirical evidence for the period is exceedingly 
limited, few new resources have been uncovered to contribute to the debate, so 
that the battle over Dithakong becomes a co_~t~st on __ Il!_et~o_do!q_gicaJ and 
historiogra2hical grounds. By applying a rigorous methodology, it will be argued 
~-~~-~o--~=~~=-~'--------=-----~-• ~~~-.-------~~-" ~- -- -- - .._ 
that with regard to Dithakong the revisionist versions have been forced to meet 
the demands of their larger suppositions, which ultimately brings their singular 
Eurocentric theory of violence into question, with particular regard to the nature 
of the conflict west of the Drakensberg. Without completely returning to the 
traditional 'mfecane' model, a S)'.'~thesis approach·;vill be proposed whereby the 
- - . •---- . 
conflicts are viewed as a ~_2_mplex inte~l~y_ ~f '_EurQR_e~}}:_ a,gg _ .Afro_~entri<; _ _fQrces. _ 
In this way, the thesis aims to contribute a more reliable methodological and 
historiographical framework with respect to the history of the early nineteenth-
century southern African interior. 
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2. THE REPORTERS OF DITHAKONG 
Robert Moffat, the m!§siona!)'. at Ku!'!lman, John Melvill, the ,g_overnment agen~ 
at Grigua Town, and George Thompson, a'Cape Town merchant, constitute the 
- - - .. . 
main literate reporters of the events at Dithakong.1 They described Dithakong 
come froll!_ ~~e-~~st . .!:or i;nany mon!!!_s P!ior_ to this confrontation, there had been 
numerous _rumours_ concerning the approach of this 'Goth-like army', which was 
reported to have _destroyed many communitie,s in its advance. The 'horde' was 
depicted as 'hungry wolves' whose object appeared 'not so much to war, as to 
devour the produce of the land of which they [got 1 possession.'2 Believing these 
reports to have little foundation, Robert ~offat,. who resided amongst the 
Tlhaping, a group of Tswana living to the north of the Orange River at Kuruman 
J\ (also known as Lattakoo) beyond the north-western frontier of the colony, 
\ continued to carry out his intentions to journey northwards to the Ngwaketse, 
another Tswana group, in the hope of establishing amicable relations. Before 
reaching his destination, however, Moffat became convinced of the 'Mantatee' 
I ' 
'- ) ' ' 
1For Moffat's account, see his letters and journal in I. Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship 
at Kuruman, London, 1951, pp. 73-111, see also R. Moffat, Missionaiy Labours and 
Scenes in Southern Africa, London, 1842, ch.21-22; for Melvill's, see G. Thompson, 
Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa, Cape Town reprint, 1962, (originally London, 
1827), pp. 174-185; for Thompson's, see ibid., pp.87-129. For further sources of the 
events, see The South African Commercial Advertiser, 7 Jan. 1824, reprinted in G.M. 
Theal, Records of the Cape Colony, 34 vols., London, 1902-05, 16, pp.497-505; R.L. Cope 
(ed.), The Journals of the Rev. T.L. Hodgson, Johannesburg, 1977, pp.180-182. 
2Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, pp.77,78. 
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presence and made a hurried return to Kuruman, fearing for the safety of the 
place, since the 'Mantatee' were advancing southwards (see map 1), 
'.A meeting was held amongst the leaders of the Tlhaping to consider what line of 
action to adopt. It was decided to seek the aid of the Griqua, who resided to the 
south and whose possession of firearms could save Kuruman from possible 
\) - ' destruction. After Moffat had failed to reach an agreement of peace with the 
' 'Mantatee', the Griqua and Tlhaping entered into battle for their very lives on 26 
·,.June 1823 at Dithakong. Eight hours later, the 'Mantatee' had been dispelled, and 
Kuruman had been saved.3 
· The narratives of the original reporters agree well with one another in both 
> -~-"'""""'"'"--~ - -
. .._ sequence and occurrence, and appear unlikely to be attempts at collusion. They 
are _all ~mphatic about !h~ 'Mantatee' _ threa~. However, the revisionists show 
extreme scepticism towards the eyewitness narratives. 165 years later, they suggest 
that the original accounts have been accepted uncritically. In the final analysis, 
with a few exceptions, they present the reporters as outrageous liars who 
deliberately deceived the public as to their real intentions. 
Both Cobbing and Richner attempt to situate Dithakong in terms of colonial 
demands for labour. Cobbing argues that an in depth reading of the evidence 
' 
-
3For the above events, see, ibid., pp.73-95,~ /-' 
,....,.·-
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reveals the battle of Dithakong was no more than a slave raid organized by 
Moffat and Melvill to meet the colony's labour problem. The 'Mantatee' threat 
was a mere alibi for the raid.4 
Richner has clearly struggled to reconcile the integrity and compassion of Moffat 
with the appellation of slave trader. He has continued to present Dithakong as a 
raid but without implicating Moffat. In what he ingeniously calls the Tlhaping 
'commercial jealousy scare', Richner argues that the trade monopoly of the 
Tlhaping was in danger of being undermined when Moffat ventured to the 
Ngwaketse. In order to prevent Moffat from reaching the Ngwaketse, the 
Tlhaping chief, Mothibi, used the 'Mantatee' scare and fed him messages about 
'Mantatee' movements that were able to frighten Moffat into turning home. By 
this ·stage, Moffat completely believed the 'Mantatee scare' and made a hurried 
journey to Griqua Town to seek Griqua support. Mothibi's new 'commercial 
jealousy scare' had now developed a momentum of its own. Fearing the Griqua 
would take his cattle if there was no 'horde', Mothibi was forced to designate a 
victim people which unfortunately comprised the inhabitants of Dithakong. 
Richner believes Melvill used the opportunity to seize slaves for distribution in 
the colony. Once again, then, Dithakong was a raid for cattle and slaves that took 
place under the cover of the 'Mantatee' myth.5 
4Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.492,493 .. 
5Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', pp.7-8. 
10 
Gewald continues in the genre of Dithakong-as-raid. He treats the slaving aspect 
as a side issue, but his thesis is also an explicit attempt to explain the events 
without reference to African agents involved in a knock-on process from the east. 
He argues that Dithakong resulted from a 'complex of factors' related to 'tensions 
internal to and between, the Orange river outlaws, the Tlhaping polity, the Griqua 
polity and the missionaries.' He suggests the 'raid' constituted the logical 
conclusion of the development of events in Transorangian history, which 
particularly involved the quest for socio-economic-political stabilization on the 
part of the Tlhaping, Griqua and missionaries.6 
This chapter will aim to expose the m~nipulated nature of the revisionist critiques,. 
which comprise an assault on the very historical process itself. They Jail, 
\.. particularly, to .co~sider .all known relevant facts, ~nd to engage themselves in the 
continuous dialectical process of ~oulding their facts. !O the interpretatio.n and 
.: t·h~ir interpretation to the facts.7 They 2-Ccept as much of the reporters' accounts 
as they find _conveni(!nt, then ignore or repudiate other parts of the same 
documents which contradict their notions. Their selection of what is· 'authentic' 
,,,.----
and what is 'unauthentic' in the accounts is often quite arbitrary based on a 
pre~~ll~e.i.v~d bias? and supported by previous arbitrary conclusions. 
6Gewald, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.1, p.7, ch.7, pp.1-2. 




Their tendency is to dwell upon certain incidental details, which has caused them 
to question the historical reliability of the narratives. They give a central position 
to these incidental historical details and attempt to seize hints of 'suppressed 
evidence'. However, it will be argued that the eyewitness accounts have yet to be 
proved inconsistent. Such small unsolved problems do not necessarily constitute 
errors, but are often the result of ignorance or lack of information. For this 
reason, the authprs ought to be given the benefit as possessing great advantage 
with respect to small details, in relation to researches writing centuries later. The 
literary critic, therefore, should continue to follow Aristotle's dictum, that 'the 
benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself and not arrogated by the 
critic to himself, until such a time the author disqualifies himself by 
contradictions or known factual inaccuracies.8 
By examining each reporter's fr~~e of reference and ~~sic presuppositions about 
life,""it will be argued that what they state is consistent with their charac~r. The 
revisionists' criticisms are not adequate enough to overturn the reliability of their 
accounts. !f, inde,~_{)L ~lte r~i:>orte:t§ had_ J;>~e11 lyiJ!g?..-ip. each case they would have 
been displaying c~mR!~t~ _ir:icornp(l_!il:>Hi!Y with what is known about thei~..ti>f 
their lives. 




Robert Moffat has long been upheld as one of the more prominent conservative, 
evangelical figures of missionary enterprise of the nineteenth-century.9 As a 
member of the London Missionary Society (L.M.S.), his labours in southern 
Africa, predominantly at Kuruman over a period of fifty-four years, have been 
viewed in a positive and respectable light. At present, however, his integrity is 
under attack in what appears to be a reversion to the Majeke thesi~ of the 
"1950's.10 Particularly in the Cobbing . critique, Moffat is characterized as a 
colonial collaborator, acting as an. agent of imperial conquest. At Dithakong, it 
is claimed that he was 'consciously engrossed' in collecting slaves to meet the 
labour demands of the colony. Cobbing believes that in Moffat, 'we have to wade 
through a surreal, self-exculpatory version of events, in which the missionaries are 
depicted as restraining their brutal Griqua and Tlhaping allies, solicitously 
protecting the women and children, wringing their hands at the bestiality of 
9See his biographical portrayals, D. Deanne, Robert Moffat: The Missionary Hero . 
of Kuruman, London; C. Field, Heroes of Missionary Enterprise, London, 1908; C. 
Northcott, Robert Moffat: Pioneer in Africa, London, 1961; J.S. Moffat, The Lives of 
Robert and Mary Moffat, London, 1885; E.W. Smith, Robert Moffat: One of God's 
Gardeners, London, 1925; W. Walters, Life and Labours of Robert Moffat, London, 
1882. 
10N. Majeke (pseudonym of Dora Taylor), The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest, 
Johannesburg, 1953. The thesis argues that the primary role of the missionaries was to 




Clearly the very nature of missionary activity and its motives is under assault. This 
section of the chapter will attempt to exonerate Moffat from the accusation that 
he was a slave trader and colonial agent by exploring the impact of his 
conservative, evangelical assumptions, which fundamentally conditioned his 
distinctive worldview. To this end, Moffat will be placed within the changing 
social and religious climate of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century British 
society. He will then be situated in the southern African context, where it will be 
considered whether his views and actions were transformed, or whether he 
remained consistent to his conditioning in Britain. 
His early life 
Robert Moffat was born in Ormiston, Scotland 1795. Little is known of his 
father's origins. During Robert's early years, his father worked in the Custom's 
Office. His mother, Ann Gardiner, came from a family who had lived for many 
years at Ormiston 'in a lowly walk of life, their only distinction having been a 
steady and unobtrusive piety.'12 Both his parents were strict Calvinists, who 
11Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp. 492,493. As noted, Richner exonerates Moffat. 
Gewald is not explicit on Moffat. He suggests that either Moffat was deceived or that he 
deliberately attempted to assert his authority in the region. Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as 
Mantatees', ch.6, p.8, ch.7, p.2. 
12Moffat, Lives, p.1. 
14 
feared the awesome wrath of God. Such 'a sternness of religious belief bordering 
on gloomy vindictiveness'13 was common to Scottish society of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century. 
This distinctively rigid form of Calvinism had been introduced by John Knox, the 
Scottish reformer, and over the years had entrenched itself as the dominant 
theology. It was a particularly sombre theology aimed at placating the wrathful 
vengeance of the great High God. ~4 Robert's father epitomized the results of 
such a theology. He was a grim man embracing upright principles for fear of 
judgement. His mother was characterized by her loving tenderness. She would 
advance positive instruction with regard to her religion. She would read to her 
children the Holy Scriptures and inform them about the progress of the gospel. 
For example, she would tell them about the labours of the Moravian Brethren in 
Greenland and the East Indies. 
Robert had little formal teaching. In 1806, the family moved to Carron Shore 
where he attended a parish school. Here, once again, he was confronted with the 
. 
grave form of religion to which he had been introduced through his parents. The 
school was directed by a stern minister, Wully Mitchell, who in his first lessons 
was already facing the class with such questions as 'What is the chief end of 
13Ibid., p.4. 
14
See A. Drummond and J. Bulloch, The Scottish Church 1688-1843, Edinburgh, 
1973; J. Watson, The Scot of the Eighteenth Century, London, 1907. 
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man?', and answermg them with rigid doctrinal precision.15 Robert did not 
remain at the school for long. His desire was to study botany and horticulture, 
and he was soon apprenticed as a gardener. 
In 1813, he was appointed to manage gardens at High Leigh, Cheshire. It was 
here that his life would be radically transformed through his association with a 
group of Wesleyan Methodists. Up to this point, though, Robert had not taken 
religion seriously. He only read the Bible as a duty to his mother. He was well 
acquainted with the gospels but had never paid particular attention to them. The 
religion to which he had become accustomed merely comprised an ethical code 
to be followed and a cultural necessity not to be questioned. 
Rationalistic thought had exerted an important influence on the Christian belief 
system during the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century in both Scotland and 
England. On the one hand, it had resulted in the growth of Moderatism, a school 
of thought which reduced the Christian religion to a system of morality, to the 
detriment of the doctrine of experiential Christianity. It was generally believed 
that Christianity was untrue, but useful to society. On the other hand, the threat 
of rationalistic thought had initiated the retreat of Christianity into a system of 
15Moffat, Lives, p.2. Robert recalled this event to one of his sons in a letter written 
fifty years later. 
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austere, traditional religious convictions beyond the realm of inquiry.16 
The rise of Methodism, however, in the 1740's returned to Christianity its historic, 
biblical, conservative and evangelical doctrines from which it derived its 
dynamism. It was presented as a complete worldview encompassing absolute truth 
centred on the authority and reliability of the Bible, and the redeeming work of 
Jesus Christ in history. An emphasis on the personal experience, the work of the 
Holy Spirit, and true spirituality as both an inward and outward holiness within 
a whole personal and social context was therefore restored. Methodism also 
stressed reconciliation of the relationship with the loving God as opposed to the 
grim, austere religion of the day.17 
This was the version of Christianity which influenced Moffat so strongly during 
his residence at Cheshire. Moffat was confronted with the reality of the 
implications of the Christian beliefs, particularly with the personal ramifications 
for h.is very own soul. His association with the Wesleyan Methodists brought an 
initial period of uncertainty and restlessness, as he struggled with the ultimate 
meaning of life. It was a time of doubt, hesitation and harbouring of suspicions, 
16For further discussion, see W.H. Fitchett, Wesley and his Century, New York, 1925; 
H. McLeod, Religion and the Working Class in the Nineteenth Century, London, 1984, 
p.17. 
17For an in depth analysis of Methodism, see W.H. Fitchett, Wesley and his Century; 
E. Halevy, The Birth of Methodism in England, Chicago, 1971; W.J. Warner, The 
Wesleyan Movement in the Industrial Revolution, New York, 1930; F. Whaling (ed.), 
John and Charles Wesley: selected writings and hymns, London, 1981. 
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yet fundamentally he knew he was faced with the question, 'What think ye of 
Christ?' His response at this stage was, 'I dared not answer.'18 
Eventually, although having read the Bible on many previous occasions, its central 
dogmas began to penetrate his being. In his own words, he perceived 'what God 
' had done for the sinner, and what was required of the sinner to obtain the Divine 
favour and the assurance of eternal life'. He came to appreciate the doctrine of 
-
justification by faith and, from this point onwards, he spoke of being at peace with 
God through the Lord Jesus Christ.19 
The impact of his personal conversion and UJ!_~!v!ded commitment to Je_~us Ch~i_st . 
as Saviour is imperative in situating Moffat. His conversional experience would 
transform and reshape the direction of his future altogether. For the rest of his 
life, he would ~ork from a _conse_~~ti~e! ___ ev_~~ge!~cal, Chri~t_i~J! .. ~asis:__ This set of 
presuppositions would fundamentally shape his worldview and radically alter his 
perceptions and activities. 
18Moffat, Lives, Robert Moffat's own narrative, p.12. 
19Ibid., narrative by Robert Moffat, p.14. 
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The impact and evolution of a worldview 
Moffat now preoccupied himself with the pursuits of his Methodist friends with 
strong intensity of resolve. It did not matter that they were viewed with the 
'severest approach',20 and as fanatics by the Established Church. He vigorously 
defended his faith in correspondence with his father and, when opportunities 
arose, he was quick to convince others of the biblical truth of pers~nal repentance 
and faith in Jesus Christ. He spent his leisure time in long hours of study of the 
Bible . 
. However, Moffat now became restless and impatient. Life at Cheshire was 
exceedingly dull. Believing absolute truth, purpose and meaning to h~ve gained 
hold of his very soul, he required to seek dynamic means of expressing these 
energies. He began to daydream and imagine a noble, determined future. It was 
in this mood w~ilst walking to Warrington admiring God's creation, thinking of 
his aimless past, pondering the present ('How little I could do')21 and visualising 
a brighter future, that he viewed a poster that was to give clarity of expression to 
his new-found beliefs. The poster announced a talk by the rev. William Roby of 
the L.M.S. on the missionary cause. A vision stirred in Moffat's mind that 




fired with the resolve to become a messenger of .salvation to some 'benighted' 
part of the world.22 Not even a lucrative job offer would change his resolve. 
Moffat soon visited Roby to discuss the prospects of a missionary life. Roby 
secured a jpb for Moffat in the nursery garden of Mr. Smith in Dukinfield, 
I 
Manchester in order to have close contact for instruction from the L.M.S. Here, 
he would meet his future wife, Mary, daughter of Mr. Smith, who was also 
passionately concerned for missionary work. She would strongly encourage Moffat 
in his missionary zeal and strengthen him in his basic convictions.23 
Roby gave to Moffat the only theological training he would ever receive. Roby 
had been born into the Church of England, yet had later become a 
Congregationalist minister. He preached basic conservative, evangelical 
Christianity, and was one of the founder members of the L.M.S., of which he was 
later made a director. A close relationship would develop between the two men, 
bonded by their passionate burden for missionary activity. Moffat related that 
Roby's kindness 'like that· of a father, will not be easily obliterated from my 
mind.'24 
22For Moffat's own narrative of the events, see ibid., pp.16, 17. 
23For the most comprehensive account of Mary Moffat, see M. Dickson, Beloved 
Partner: Mary Moffat of Kuruman, London, 1976. See also, Moffat, Lives, pp.48~61. 
24Deanne, Robert Moffat: The Missionary Hero of Kuruman, p.26. 
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Roby's 'System of Divinity', which consisted of eighty lectures, formed the basis 
of Moffat's perception of his religious position.25 This system of theology became 
deeply engrained in the very person of Moffat, and would serve as his frame of 
reference for his many years in southern Africa.26 The particular form of 
orthodox theology provided Moffat with the authority and impetus for his calling. 
This resembled thought-forms of nineteenth-century evangelicalism, which were 
central to the ideology of the protestant missionary movement, and key to the 
formation of Moffat's worldview. 
The lectures taught that the objective of missionary enterprise involved the 
restoration of humankind to a right relationship to its creator, through the 
realisation of the lordship of Christ over the kingdoms of this world. It was 
believed that much of humanity was in overt rebellion against the governance of 
God, and that proof of that rebellion was 'heathen idolatry'. All religions apart 
from evangelical Christianity were categorized as idolatrous. The further human 
groups migrated from ~abel, the more corrupt and idolatrous became their 
religion from the original biblical state of pure revealed religion. Following 
Romans 1: 18-32, this regression to idolatry meant increasing moral degeneration, 
as God gave people over to the consequences of their own rejection of him. 
25Northcott, Robert Moffat: Pioneer in Africa, pp.22,23. Notice how diligently and 
industriously Moffat copied out, in more than 460 pages, the content of these lectures, 
reflecting the high value with which he considered his tutoring. 





The perceived depraved nature of idolatrous people led to the belief in the 
eternal perdition of the 'heathen'. Unless they believed in Christ, they were lost 
for all eternity. 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 specified support that no idolater would 
inherit the kingdom of God. Many Christians, including Moffat, were haunted by 
the vision of vast numbers who were being lost. Moffat's conception of the 
'degraded, despised, yet beloved mortals' perishing abroad, imparted within him 
a sense of absolute urgency and priority, to preach Christ and the words of eternal 
life, besides which any political considerations were insignificant.27 He was 
concerned more than anything else with the business of saving souls. His 
relationship to political forces must be viewed as a matter of inconsequential 
importance. 
On 31 October 1816, Moffat set sail for the Cape of Good Hope. He left behind 
. his parents, which was a particularly painful experience considering that to 
venture abroad meant virtually the equivalent of- saying goodbye forever. His 
intention of pursuing his vision under such circumstances confirms the extent to 
which he was convicted of his historic, evangelical assumptions. He was burdened 
with weighted responsibility and sincere commitment to those 'perishing' abroad. 
Although only twenty when ordained as a missionary, he has been described as 
27Moffat, Lives, Robert Moffat to parents, 23 Sept. 1816, p.26. Note the weight of 
Moffat's concern, 'Oh that I had a thousand lives, and a thousand bodies: all of them 
should be devoted to no other employment but to preach Christ to these degraded, 
despised yet beloved mortals.' 
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a man mat_u~~Jn_ self-possession and in Christian faith. 28 The delineation of his 
evangelical worldview had largely been shaped by the time he arrived in southern 
Africa, and it would sustain him for the next fifty years. 
Moffat in southern Africa 
It is important to consider whether Moffat's version of the truth about total reality 
would stand the demands of a new cultural context. To what extent would his 
. ----=---=- - ·-·- - -
worldview define his practice and, conversely, to what extent would his 
e~p~Ii~nces--dictate the -boun_dariesof his b~oad_~! assu_I!!Rtions? It will be argued 
that far from changing his beliefs, his African. e~perje~ces -~~tified the outlin~ of 
Namaqualand 
Moffat arrived in Cape Town, January 1817. He was first assigned to the 
N amaqualand mission in the sparse and barren northern Cape. If ever there was 
to be a trial with regard to the obstinance and durability of Moffat's beliefs, it 
would involve his year of 'apprenticeship' in Namaqualand under the harsh', 
realities of the African world. He was soon confronted with what he described as 
28Walters, Life and Labours, p.28. 
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the 'brutish degradation'29 of those around him, and was quic)<: to reject the 
~......-,-..., ·~~-.... --... ~-·----.--- -~-~-~- . ~-~~-~~-~-
concept of the 'noble savage'. His encounters with the indigenous people 
confirmed for him the grave moral consequences of idolatry in departure from 
pure revealed religion. He described how the baneful influence of their beliefs 
extended to all aspects of their culture. The people were 'despised', 'fallen', 
'choosing darkness rather than light'. 
Interestingly, then, the hard reality of the new environment served to confirm the 
fundamental tenets of Moffat's worldview, which encouraged him further. Rather 
.:.t:..__ . . . ·- - -·· - .. ·~-. . - .. 
than repel him, his resolve was quickened and his heart stirred. In his own words: 
In the midst of these hardships I felt, as I do at this moment, that 
I desire to suffer anything, even death itself, if but Christ is glorified 
in the salvation of the poor heathen. 30 
After all that I have suffered, I am not tired but strengthened, and 
feel myself more a missionary than I ever was before in my life. 31 
His experiences rooted him more deeply in his Lord's cause with desperate 
concern for the lost. For him to envisage immortal souls dying for lack of 
knowledge was a bad dream - 'How can we be faint-or weary'32- he would say. 
Not only was his missiona!Y zeal hastened, but the reality of Moffat's enduring 
( 
29Moffat, Lives, p.39. 
\ 
30Ibid., Robert Moffat to parents, 15 Dec. 1818, p.40. 
/
11bid., Robert Moffat to father, 16 April 1819, p.46. 
/ 
32Ibid., Robert Moffat to parents, 15 Dec. 1818, p.41. 
'~ 
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relationship with his God was enriched and intensified. He related: 'although 
greatly cast down of late, but have at the same time been enabled to love and 
confide in Him who sticketh closer than a brother, and have been more than ever 
led to see the mutability of every earthly comfort'.33 
Moffat laboured in Namaqualand for a year amongst the subjects of Afrikaner, 
an Oorlam originally from the colony. He formed a close relationship with 
Afrikaner, who was once a raiding outlaw and since 1817-8, a Christian convert. 
It was Moffat's joy to teach Afrikaner the gospel of peacefulness and 
reconciliation. Moffat viewed him as a brother, which emphasizes an important 
distinction with respect to Moffat's perception of the 'heathen'. Although the 
'heathen' were 'degraded', 'despised' and 'fallen', yet they were created in the 
image of God and were thus all equal in the eyes of God as possessing worth and 
dignity as individuals. They were still 'fellow-creatures' and 'beloved mortals'.34 
Therefore, it was fundamental to treat a fellow human being with the utmost 
respect and love. This would characterise Moffat's h_!gtJ vie~ o_L hu1J!?_!1}tjJ1d~ 
throughout his residence in southern Africa. 
\, 
'. / r-: r _.., l \ 
Moffat's conciliatory teaching had important effects on Afrikaner, which led to a 
33Ibid., p.42. 
34Ibid., Robert Moffat to parents, 23 Sept. 1816, p.26. See also the incident when 
Moffat admonished a wealthy farmer for not allowing his servants to be present at a 
service. This was premised on the idea that all of humankind is equal before God and 
therefore all should hear. See ibid., pp.32,33. 
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meeting with a prev10us bitter raiding enemy, whereby their friendship was 
restored.35 It is in this __ context of reconciliation that Moffat's jo_urney to. Cape 
Town, along with Afrikaner, needs to be interpreted. Afrikaner was still ruled an 
outlaw with a price on his head for the incursions he had previously committed 
on the colony. Moffat believed it was imperative to make peace with the governor · 
and reveal to him the changed nature of Afrikaner. The intention of the journey 
was the result of Christian reconciliation, and did not involve the conscious 
imperial act of preparing the road by disarming the chiefs with the message of 
God's peace.36 
This centres upon the important relationship of the missionary's role in relation 
to the colonial state. Moffat's attitude to this question was straightforward. He, 
unequivocally, considered a ~istinct separation between the r~le_ of_the _missionary 
/ 
and that of the government agent. He believed the involvement of the missionary 
in political affairs was dangerous and ultimately detrimental to the central task 
of preaching the Word. For this reason, whilst in Cape Town with Afrikaner, 
Moffat strictly refused an offer from the colonial office to act as government 
missionary in 'Kaffirland'. 37 Instead, he was assigned by the London Missionary 
Society to Lattakoo, beyond the north-western frontier of the colony, where he 
would spend the remainder of his years in southern Africa. 
35Moffat, Missionary Labours, pp.174, 175. 
36Ibid., pp.173-180. 
37Moffat, Lives, Robert Moffat to parents, 1820, p.77. 
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Lattakoo 
Moffat remained consistent with regards to this question of church/state affairs 
right up to Dithakong. On his journey northwards to Lattakoo, whilst at Griqua 
Town during a time of major social upheaval, it was requested that he seize 
political control and restore order. He refused, saying, 'I should use every possible 
means to sweep state affairs entirely out of the Church and Mission, and convince 
the Griquas that the Kingdom of Christ is not of this world.'38 Moffat was 
convinced the merging of both posts had no scriptural· basis and that practical 
experience had demonstrated this to be true. Moffat cited Brownlee whose 
resignation as political missionary had resulted on the grounds of the two posts 
being incompatible.39 
Having settled amongst the Tlhaping at Lattakoo, Moffat was satisfied that his 
station exhibited _no political link with the Cape g9~~r_n_rnent, as he would say, a 
fact 'which Lord Charles [Somerset, the colonial governor] knows too well to be 
my sentiment to make any proposals.'40 Moffat's relationship with Dr. Philip, 
superintendent of the London Missionary Society in southern Africa, further 
confirms Moffat's views on this point. Moffat questioned his overtly political 
38Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to James and Mary Smith, 20 
August 1822, p.61. See also ibid., Robert Moffat to Philip, 19 Sept. 1820, p.7. 
39Moffat, Missionary Labours, pp.206-208. 
40Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to James and Mary Smith, 20 
August 1822, pp.62,63. 
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stance (as well as his dictatorial style), which he believed on occasions evoked 
serious harm upon the society's central evangelical function.41 That Moffat 
,/ ~.· • • ,1 ' ' : ' 
should be depicted as c:.olonial collaborator is not an easy position to maintain. 
It is very difficult to demonstrate a close governmental link with Moffat. 
Cobbing's arguments originate from silence as he fails to expose correspondence 
/. 
signifying the association. 
Living beyond the frontier, Moffat was in the easier and less affected position of 
being able to insist upon the separation of missionary from the political affair~ of 
,· .·'' 
· the colony. But, although there existed no strong political relationship with the 
' 
colonial government at his station, this did not mean Moffat's attitudes towards 
the colonial state were so distinct and straightforward. It is important to note that 
Moffat never lost his deference to colonial and British authority. Moffat believed 
Britain had been uniquely commissioned by God to bring the gospel to the world, 
which explains to a large extent why missionaries accepted the process of 
imperialism uncritically.42 His views to this end were also shaped by the biblical 
unction of obedience to the state. However, even if there was correspondence 
from the colonial government ordering Moffat to secure labour for the colony 
(which there.is not), this would not have necessarily led to a deferential attitude 
41See, for example, their differing approaches when Philip planned to settle a series 
of political disputes amongst the Griqua in ibid., Robert Moffat to James and Mary 
Smith, 15 Nov. 1825, p. 205. See also ibid., introduction, pp.xxvii,xxviii. 
42For this conviction, see Moffat's dedication in his Missionary Labours, pp.i-iv. 
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to the command. Gospel imperatives remained the final authority. The Bible 
taught obedience to the state, but this did not mean autonomy for the state. God 
had ordained the state as a delegated authority to administer justice and to 
protect the good in society. Whenever it did the reverse, however, and its 
/' 
commands were contrary to the Word of God, it ought not to be obeyed~ Living 
I ,, 
amongst the Tswana where he taught the people to obey their leaders, Moffat was 
always quick to make a stand when a chiefs decision overstepped the mark of 
\ 
biblical law.43 for this reason, had there been a command of such a nature from ,, 
[' 
,.(. 
the colony, following the mandate of his moral and spiritual responsibilities, 
Moffat would never have complied. 
For similar reasons, Moffat questioned the involvement of the missionary in 
trading. He believed the engagement in trading could, too, prove detrimental to 
the 'grand object' of propagating the gospel. To this end, he was strongly 
condemnatory of his predecessors at Lattakoo, Edwards and Kok, for their self· 
interested bartering with the indigenous people, which he believed caused their 
downfall. For them, trading became a lucrative auxiliary. It led to Edwards later 
forsaking his faith and retiring a wealthy man in the colony. Kok was murdered 
by Tswana over renumeration for a trip to· the colony.44 Moffat was also sharply 
43Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 3 July 1822, p.52; Moffat, 
Missionary Labours, p.208. 
441bid., pp.216,217; R. Beck, 'Bibles and Beads: missionaries as traders in southern 




judgemental of the missionaries, Goeman and Read, for their attempts to win 
converts through supplying them with abundant gifts and services.45 
Although Moffat encouraged trade, he was not an active participant. He did 
however present Mothibi, chief of the Tlhaping, with gifts which had become the 
established custom of respect.46 He also did, on occasion, distribute beads and 
the odd piece of tobacco amongst the indigenous people. He aimed to keep the 
people favourably disposed towards him, therefore presenting them amenable to 
the gospel. In this way, his practice differed from his castigation of Goeman and 
Read, whom he believed had won converts pureiy on material grounds. Moffat's 
concern was for true converts who revealed a real change of heart.47 He did not 
view his role as simply alleviating the living conditions of the people and making 
their lives more comfortable. On many occasions, he would withhold his services 
-~ of social benefit and refuse handouts to demonstrate this point. · Certainly, 
·' however, Moffat did not remain unfeeling and apathetic, but rather displayed his 
.\ _!!~m~~ity .a1:1'!_ benevotence repeatedly. To be. sure, the few handouts he did 
')) 
45Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 20 July 1821, pp.19,20; ibid., 
Robert Moffat to Philip, 19 Sept. 1820, p.7; ibid., Robert Moffat to James and Mary 
Smith, 9 Dec. 1822, p.66. Legassick, however, suggests the judgement upon Read was 
unjust. See M. Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780:-
1840: the politics of a frontier zone', Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1969, p.267. 
/ '\._ l 
46Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to Philip, 19 Sept.1820, p.10; Beck, 
'Bibles and Beads', p.222. 
47For his integrity for true conversions, see Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert 
Moffat, journal, 6 Jan. 1822, pp.40,41; ibid., Robert Moffat to James and Mary Smith, 
20 August 1822, p.64. 
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apportion cannot serve as precedent for a lucrative and self-interested trade in 
cattle and slaves. 
Moffat's whole mindset, therefore, was geared to functioning in both word and 
deed towards displaying the truth of the saving grace of the gospel. His 
understanding of true spirituality was set within a total social context. True 
spirituality did not involve simply an inward holiness of heart, but had necessarily 
to find fruit in outward works and social involvement. All aspects of life required 
to accord with the tenor of the gospel. His deep sense of humanity and 
compassion is continually manifest. He tended to the sick and offered his skills 
learnt abroad as carpenter, blacksmith and gardener. His confrontation with a 
number of San, about to bury two living children along with their dead mother, / 
· ,.,, . ~ fl( ' r·11 ,./J£(1/7,J:J, 
"~> "''''""' ~ . ' ~ ') 
is a particularly relevant indication of the man's spirit. Moffat pleaded for the 
children's mercy. His petition was consented to and he brought the children under 
his care and protection.48 It is important to view this episode in terms of 
Moffat's compassion, in line with his basic presuppositions regarding the sanctity 
of life. It would be naive to interpret the events as a pre-determined soliciting of 
slaves. 
In fact, it is very difficult to situate Moffat as a slaver. He, himself, openly 
-----. ~·~ --- ,.,,........---='"'-""'---~~~-~ ..... ~~-~""- -- - -----
48Moffat, Lives, p.106. See also Moffat, Missionary Labours, pp.134, 135,325. 
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disapproved of slavery49 and was always quick to expose the evils of inter-
African slavery, and the illegal conduct of renegade European and Bergenaar · 
slave raids.50 Moffat, along with a number of British protestant missionaries, was 
profoundly influenced by the philosophy of 'Commerce and Christianity', which 
itself was an anti-slavery ideology. It was believed that the missionary was called 
to propagate the imagined benefits of western civilization alongside the Christian 
/ message. Part of the imagined benefits included legitimate and lawful commerce, 
~\ 
,/ which was considered to be the best means of cutting off the slave trade. To this 
~ end, the philosophy developed out of ideas from British liberalism, the free 
.c 
')market ideology and the humanitarian anti-slavery movements.51 Moffat adhered 
J to these views.52 He did, however, follow the gospel-first approach believing that 
an orderly pattern of life and a settled civilization were the primary fruits of 
Christian mission. Although not himself an active participant in trading, for 
reasons enumerated above, he nevertheless encouraged it. Along with the 
presuppositions of his evangelical worldview, then, which were sensitive to the 
claims ofl~~er!y and stre:s~ed_the moral t'.quality of all people, slavery went aga_inst 
his very being. 
49See his views on slavery at the synod of 1817 in Northcott, Robert Moffat: Pioneer 
in Africa, p.36. · 
~. " 50Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 30 July 1824, p.131.----._ <-~~t·"'". 
51For further discussion on the impact of these ideologies, see the section on ··' 
Thompson in this chapter. 
52For Moffat's commitment to civilization in Africa, see Moffat, Missionary Labours, 
dedication, p.ii, ibid., pp.502-508; Moffat, Lives, pp.372,373. 
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Moffat would labour at Lattakoo for nine years before the first conversions were 
made. Despite the many trials - mockery, thievery, an attempt on his very life53 -
he continued in his resolve to see the reconciliation of individuals with the loving 
personal God of the Bible. He continued to read the Word of God, kept praying 
for the 'heathen' around him and, with longing passion, looked beyond what he 
called, 'the gloomy hills of darkness',54 to the conversions of a new day. He 
yearned for the moment when the Tswana would engage themselves in a spirit of 
religious enquiry and judge Christianity for themselves. At that time, when he 
attempted to introduce religious topics in conversation, it was usually a signal for 
the Tswana to depart.55 
Their attitude only served to ratify the biblical unction that their 'hearts were 
hardened' and further convinced Moffat of his Christian assumptions. His 
methodological approach towards evangelism reflects the extent to which he had 
come to believe in the intellectual veracity of his faith. He believed it was 
imperative, in his own words, 'to become all things to all men.'56 It was essential 
to step into their shoes and understand their system of thinking, in order to reveal 
the deficiencies in their position and so lead them to the gospel. Because the 
Christian faith presented itself as verifiable absolute truth to total reality, Moffat 
'',"/ 
~ 53Moffat, Missionary Labours, pp.328,329. 
54Ibid., p.291. 
55
Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 21 May 1827, p.253. 
56Moffat, Missionary Labours, p.301. 
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believed it could withstand any system by exposing the poverty of its tenets.57 
Moffat continued, then, to instruct on both religious and secular matters with the 
Bible being his primary objective point of reference. He persistently challenged 
traditional attitudes and values with immeasurable patience. He was not silent 
when circumstances conflicted with biblical standards. He often argued with 
Mothibi about the evil of the commando system, saying that it was just and right 
to punish evildoers as according to God's Laws, but that it was wrong to destroy 
the innocent with the guilty.58 He once prevented a chief from killing an 
innocent subject which, by the ten commandments, constituted unlawful 
murder.
59 
He was not afraid to purge his little community on account of their 
incestuous conduct.6° Finally, in an important occurrence for his role at 
Dithakong, when offered many cattle by Tshosa to assist him in leading a 
commando against his father, Makaba, chief of the Ngwaketse, with whom he had 
seriously clashed, Moffat, true to his convictions responded, 'that such conduct 
was contrary to the Laws of God, and as the servants of God it was impossible 
for us to accept the invitation, no, not for all the cattle In Africa.'61 
~ \'-.r 57F or discussion on this approach, see ibid., pp.300-302. See also, Schapera (ed.), 
~ Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 21 April 1827, p.249; ibid., 6 May 1827, p.251. 
\ 
58Ibid., Robert Moffat, journal, 3 July 1822, p.52. 
59Moffat, Missionary Labours, p.208. 
60
Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to James and Mary Smith, 20 
August 1822, p.64; Deanne, Robert Moffat: The Missionary Hero of Kuruman, p.58. 
61
Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 12 Jan. 1822, p.42. 
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It should be clear that Moffat remained remarkably consistent with respect to his 
conservatiye, evangelical assumptions formed abroad. If anything, his experiences 
in southern Africa further convinced him of his Christian presuppositions as he -
languished for the 'lost' and attempted to function so that his whole life, in every 
sphere, centred around revealing the truth of the gospel. Yet at Dithakong, 
/ 
c.,according to Cobbing, Moffat uncharacteristically metamorphoses into a slave and 
~attle raider, collaborating as an agent of conquest to meet the demands of the 
!colony's labour problem. Such an accusation strikes in complete opposition to the 
lvery core of Moffat's view of the world and is incompatible with what is known 
2about the rest of his life. 
/ /' /' 
( -,_ ; ; - "/ / / ./ . t ·~ 
Dithakong 
/< ;. I~ , 
,' •' 
As noted, Cobbing believes that in Moffat 'we have to wade through a surreal, 
self-exculpatory version of events' that provides the alibi for a heinous crime.62 
However, Moffat's narrative and activities at Dithakong agree closely with his 
basic presuppositions and are consistent with respect to his character. 
-His efforts to save Kuruman adhere to his concern for the well-being of the 
people amongst whom he was living. His attempts for a peace treaty with the 
'· "numerous, foreign group concur with his high view of humankind and with his 
62Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.492,493. 
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fear of the disastrous effects of war. Being a passiPist, Moffat did not participate 
in the ensuing battle. However, whilst the Griqua were putting the 'Mantatee' to 
flight, the Tlhaping had set about slaying the defenceless women and children left 
on the battlefield, as Moffat related, 'for the sake of a few rings, or of being able 
to boast that they had killed some Mantatee.'63 In conformity with his Christian 
views concerning the dignity and worth of every individual human being, Moffat 
displayed his fierce disapproval of the unnecessary bloodshed by riding in amongst 
the Tlhaping and preventing them from killing the innocent. Finally, with the 
women and children left alone and destitute on the battlefield, and prey to the 
depredations of the Tswana, Moffat collected a number of them to provide them 
with protection and took them to Kuruman. These endeavours to help a broken 
and disbanded people corresponded with his Godly compassion and humanity.64 
Cobbing's analysis of Moffat rests on pure speculation. By reading between the 
lines, to quote a phrase, he claims 'to see fern-seed and can't see an elephant ten 
yards away in broad daylight.'65 For Cobbing to label Moffat a slave trader in 
these events, it is required of him to demonstrate a number of points. He must 
63Moffat, Missionary Labours, p.361. 
64For a detailed account of these events, see: Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert 
Moffat, journal, pp.95-100; Thompson, Travels, ch.16, headed: 'Mr. Melvill's Narration 
of Transactions after the Battle, and of His Excursion to Rescue the Women and 
Children of the Invaders', pp.174-185. 
65C.S. Lewis, Fernseed and Elephants, London, 1975, p.155. Cobbing's ideas about 
the production of history are sweeping, monolithic, simplistic and overly Eurocentric, see 
C. Hamilton, "'The character and opjects of Chaka" and their many representations in 






substantiate that Moffat did not in fact possess a high view of humankind, that 
human beings in his eyes were indeed expendable for the schemes and programs 
of the more powerful. He must show that Moffat was a proponent of the intrinsic 
relationship of the missionary's involvement in trade and state affairs. Ultimately, 
he must confirm that Moffat's conservative, evangelical assumptions played an 
insignificant role in his life. At this point, the onus is upon Cobbing to 
substantiate his surmising. For the present, the existi11g e_yiqen~.~.J~_Q!!!!§,Jo JQe 
authenticity of Moffat's account. 
The role of the missionary reconsidered 
Cobbing's critique arises out of a highly charged and polarized ideological context. 
His appraisal of Moffat and his role as missionary reflects the strong anti-colonial 
climate of the day. His analysis is a revision of the Majeke thesis of the 1950's. 
Inflamed by the resistance struggles of that period, Majeke argued that the 
missionaries acted as agents of 'divide and rule' politics. Their primary task was 
to assist the government in the subjugation of the African and herald a capitalist 
Christian civilization.66 
r 
66Majeke, The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest. Interestingly, Moffat escapes 
fierce criticism in relation to attacks upon other missionaries in her sweeping and 
j:::zeductionist critique. Moffat is presented as 'a man of upright character.' He is, however, 
\y~onceived as acting as 'an excellent ambassador for the British', and as playing an 
t important role in paving the way northwards, particularly through his relationship with 
· Mzilikazi. See pp.89,116-119. · 
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A number of studies have been advanced that have corrected and refined this 
position.67 Certainly along with the task of proclaiming the gospel, missionaries 
believed that they were also called to propagate the imagined benefits of western 
. . 
civilization and commercialism. These were features inherent to British imperial 
/ 
,~k_, colonialist expansion, which did not bear any necessary relationship to 
conservative, evangelical Christianity, and which suggests missionaries did have 
imperial interests at heart. However, although the missionaries were prone to 
transmit these values, their prime motivation remained the promotion of 
Christianity. That they brought in values to transform African society was not so 
much a process parallel to the proclamation of the gospel, as its necessary and 
inevitable consequence. It was believed that African societies were in need of 
comprehensive regeneration, and that the gospel itself would bring about this 
transformation. The fact that the gospel became married with socio-economic 
values of British culture in this process is what ought to be considered. 
The evangelical understanding of the doctrine of divine providence in the early 
nineteenth-century goes a long way in explaining why most missionaries accepted 
these cultural trappings. Enlightenment thought played an important part in 
fashioning the evolution of this biblical doctrine. I~ was believed that Britain had 
67J.R. Cochrane, Servants of Power: the role of English-speaking Churches in South 
Africa: 1903-1930, Johannesburg, 1987, ch.2; AJ. Dachs, 'Missionary History- A Conflict 
.oflnterpretation', Southern African Research in progress: Collected papers.,2; B. Stanley, 
The Bible and the Flag, Leicester, 1990; M. Wilson, 'Missionaries: Conquerors or 
Servants of God?', an address given on the occasion of the official opening of the South 
African Missionary Museum, January, 1976. 
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been uniquely commissioned by God to bring the gospel to the world. Britain was 
the archetype of a Christian nation, constituting a model of Christian culture and 
society. Therefore, it was the missionary's task to introduce to African society 
similar features of Britain's economic, political and cultural experience. In this 
way, the gospel became linked with British national interests. 
Clearly the missionaries were not conscious enough of the need to be distinctive 
from the cultural assumptions of their own social heritage. Stirred by national 
pride, they failed to apply the ethical standards of the Bible as strictly to their 
own nation as they did to the societies amongst which they laboured. At the same 
time, it is a difficult task to propagate a culture -free gospel. Since religion and 
culture are inextricably linked, it is well nigh impossible to promote the Christian 
message unadulterated from cultural influences.68 
In the case of Moffat, whatever his cultural wrappings and personal limitations, 
it is certainly difficult to view his missionary zeal in terms of British imperialism. 
/\!) f 
Instead, he needs to be placed within the theological context of the evangelical 
revival and his conversion. In the southern African situation, his evangelical 
objectives remained his central concern. He certainly did attempt to transfer 
perceived benefits of his British cultural and societal experience, which he 
believed were the civilizing results of the gospel in the first place, into the 
68For probably the most convincing and helpful study of the above issues, see Stanley, 





southern African context. However, imperialist goals were by no means his 
intention. As the Africans themselves would later say, although at first they had 
thought that he might represent the colonial governor, as they came to understand 
him they were fully convinced that he was a messenger of the church of God.69 
John Melvill 
John Melvill was appointed government agent at Griqua Town on 21March1822. 
His strong religious convictions drove him to consider the position. In the past, 
his integrity~s government agent for peace and stability, in accordance with his 
religious nature, has been acknowledged. He consistently crushed lawlessness, and 
However, Cobbing believes it is clear from the account of Melvill, who was 
present at the battle, that he was one of 'the instigators and organizers both of the 
raid and the disposal of the prisoners.' Along with Richner, he believes Melvill 
was sending slaves into the colony under the cover of the 'Mantatee threat.'70 
Co_bbing suggests that Melvill rec;eived payment in ammunition for the 'slaves', "I-
69Moffat, Missionary Labours, p.236. 
70Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.492,493. See also Richner, 'The withering away 
of the "lifaqane'", p.8. Gewald suggests that Melvill's involvement derived from a 
predetermined attempt to consolidate his position amongst the Griqua, perhaps coupled 
with a self-interested preoccupation with trading. Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', 
ch.5, p.11, ch.7, p.2. 
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and that he gained thirty-three cattle from the raid. The fact that Melvill 
supposedly received a similar amount of cattle after an attack on Sefunela's 
Rolong in 1824, Cobbing believes gives credence to his hypothesis.71 By placing 
Melvill within the background of his ambitions and ideals, and by contextualising 
the above events, this section of the chapter will attempt to establish the 
reliability of his account. 
Melvill's goals and aspirations 
Melvill arrived at the Cape in 1799. He was trained in surveying, and by 1821 he 
was receiving the handsome sum of 7000 rix-dollars per annum as government 
inspector of public buildings. A deeply religious man, Melvill had long displayed 
sympathy for the cause of missions. In 1819, he had offered himself as a lay 
assistant to the L.M.S. Later, in 1827, having resigned his government post at 
Griqua Town, he would become a missionary linked with the L.M.S., and would 
continue to reside amongst the Griqua.72 
The post of government agent had first been suggested to Melvill by the former 
missionary at Griqua Town, Anderson. Griqua Town still remained beyond the 
71For the supposed benefits, see Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.493. For the 
supposed raid of 1824, see ibid., p.497. 
72For his background, see: Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the 
Missionaries', p.296; Thompson, Travels, p.82; C.J. Beyers (chief ed.), Dictionary of 
South African Biography, Durban, 1981, 4, p.357. 
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borders of the Cape Colony, and it appears that the colonial government wished · 
for some continued colonial presence there at minimum expense. Having 
journeyed into the region inquiring into their affairs, he resolved to forsake his 
position as inspector of buildings for the government agency at a salary of only 
1000 rix-dollars.73He had been deeply disturbed by the unfortunate conditions 
' 
of the Griqua, and had determined to help them by attempting to convert them 
to Christianity, and by aiming to bring to them the benefits of western 
civilisation.74Thompson alludes to the integrity of Melvill's honest intentions 
· when he noted that 'his praiseworthy motives and generous self-devotion' could 
not for a moment be in doubt.75 The missionaries, John Philip, Broadbent and 
Moffat, also . held Melvill in high regard, noting his sincerity and good 
intentions. 76 
However, although noting the 'benevolent purposes' and 'honourable objectives' 
73Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', p.296. 
~/ 74Thompson, Travels, p.82. Interestingly, since Melvill intended to further missionary 
~ operations at Griqua Town, Moffat in line with his insistence upon the separation of 
• ....l church and state was whoIIy against Melvill's appointment. See Schapera (ed.), 
Apprenticeship, Moffat to James and Mary Smith, 20 August 1822, pp.61,62. 
75Thompson, Travels, p.82. 
76J. Philip, Researches in South Africa, 2 vols., London, 1828, ii, p.79; S. Broadbent, 
A Narrative of the first introduction of Christianity amongst the Barolong tribe of 
Bechuanas. South Africa, London, 1865, p.132; Papers Relative to the Condition and 
Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa Within the Colony of the Cape 
of Good Hope or Beyond the Frontier of That Colony. part 1, London, 1835, Evidence 
before Government Commission, April 1824, p.128. The fact that Moffat opposed 
Melvill's appointment did not detract from his friendship or respect for the man. 
• 
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of Melvill, both Thompson and Moffat believed he did not possess the necessary 
qualifications to deal with the political affairs of such a divided and unstable 
polity. He was described as being not 'terribly discerning', and his disinterested 
and ineffectual nature seemed to have restricted him from a clear analysis of 
Griqua affairs. 77 
By the end of 1822, the Griqua had essentially divided into three factions - the 
~gricultural faction_!!n_ile_r_ Ap_dries _W~!erboer ~t Griqua_ TO\YJl, the p~storal elit_e 
under the ~~d~aptey_g~'_! Adam _KC?k _I! ~nd Bar_end Barends at Cam2bell and 
Daniel's Kuil respectively, and the Bergenaars, a breakaway renegade group ------ - - ·-· - --- ... - -- -~~- . 
residing in the vicinity of the ~Qdder River.78 O_tigina!Jy, !h~ G~iqua p_o}i_!y had 
been e~tablished around Griqua Town in 189~· However, over the years, the 
foundation of this socio-economic order had been undermined. Melvill attempted - - - --
to stabilize the situation by supporting the newly-appointed Waterboer. He was 
an ardent backer of Waterboer, usually unquestioningly conforming to his 'better' 
judgement. This undisputed allegiance served to alienate Melvill from the old 
'kapteyns'. Waterboer's rule was often characterized by impetuous and immature 
decisions. To this end, Melvill's role as government agent ought to be questioned 
as much of his interference into the affairs of the Griqua led to further conflict 
77See ibid., p.128; Thompson, Travels, p.82. 
78For a more detailed discussion, see ch.3, the section on the Griqua. 
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and dissension.79 
However, Melvill continued in the sincere belief that he was acting for the good 
of the Griqua, and he was not beyond offering some contribution. According with 
his religious nature, he sought peace and stability in the region by consistently 
crushing lawlessness. His efforts to enforce regulations even led to the departure 
of lawless elements from Griqua Town, who would augment the growing, unruly 
Bergenaar community. In the future, the Bergenaars would provoke much 
disorder by raiding for both cattle and human beings to trade illegally with 
r 
colonial frontiersmen. MeJvill condemned their activities vehemently, and was 
quipk to expose the immoral conduct of, both the Be_£genaars and the white 
settlers.8° For Melvill to be engaged in illegal slave trading that he everywhere 
else condemned is hardly consistent. Such objectives would not be compatible 
with his original goals and aspirations. That the 'raid' was intended to reassert his 
. authority amongst the Griqua and strengthen the position of his protege 
Waterboer, as Gewald suggests, similarly negates his primary motivations and 
79For an in depth discussion on Melvill's involvement in Griqua affairs, see: 
Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.298-306; M. 
Kinsman, 'Populists and Patriarchs: The Transformation of the Captaincy at Griqua 
Town, 1804-1822', in A. Mabin (ed.), Organisation and Economic Change, Southern 
African Studies, 5, Johannesburg, 1989, pp.10,11. 
80Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, Extract 
1 from a report by Melvill relative to the state of the Griqua, Dec. 1824, pp.214-219. See 
_,ek also E.A. Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, ca.1800-1830 - The 
· ~ y "mfecane" reconsidered', paper prepared for The 'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new 
j,/~paradigm, University of Witwatersrand, 6-9 Sept. 1991, pp.32-34. 
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impulses. 
There is no correspondence of collusion with the colonial government to suggest 
a predetermined raid. Again, such arguments originate from silence. Melvill, in 
fact, received little government support. Stockenstrom, for example, Landdrost of 
Graaf-Reinet and responsible for the middle Orange, tended to support the old 
'kapteyns', Kok and Barends, who were his old friends, as opposed to Waterboer 
and Melvill.81 By this time, colonial authorities appear to have given little 
attention to affairs in Griqualand.82 
The aftermath of the battle 
Probably the major reason for both Cobbing and Richner's extreme scepticism 
relates to MelyiW_sJqle i_11_!_~~-~vents surrounding the aftermath of the battle. 
Without refuting his interpretations given to the events; they completely ignore 
and reject his internal testimony. Instead, they accuse him as being 'consciously 
engrossed' in the collection and disposal of slaves and cattle. However, the fact 
that cattle and~_prj~~~I!~!~ we~~"aken and distributed by Melvill does not 
necessarily imply a raid, but can be more rationally explained in terms of the 
81Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', 
pp.306,316,317,322,323. See also Philip, Researches, ii, pp.292-307. 
82For an in depth discussion on colonial policies towards Griqualand, see: Legassick, 






inevitable aftermath of a victorious, defensive battle. His actions were a_by-. 
. Produ~_!__Qf the battle and not its cause. 
It has already been ident,ified that following the retreat of the 'Mantatee', a 
number of women and children were left on the battlefield destitute and 
famished. Having wandered across the interior for many months, they now 
appeared exhausted, broken and distressed with hunger.83 Alone on the 
battlefield, they were prey to the depredations of the Tswana, who during the 
battle had only too clearly shown their intentions by slaying the defenceless 
women and children.84 Out of compassion, the defenceless were offered ~ 
protection and a number were taken to Kuruman.85 Many others, however, chose 
to remain on the battlefield and were later murdered by revengeful Tswana as 
/ 
' 
they sought to return to their defeated peoples.86 This was the realisation of the < 
well-founded fears that had induced both Melvill and Moffat to provide sanctuary 
to them. 
83See Eldredge's response to Cobbing's assertion that the women and children could 
not have been starving, Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa', p.30. 
84Moffat, Missionary Labours, p.361. 
85For Melvill's account of these events, see: Thompson, Travels, ch.16, headed: 'Mr. 
.~ Melvill's Narrative of Transactions after the Battle, and of His Excursion to Rescue the 
Women and Children of the Invaders', pp.174-185. See also Schapera (ed.), 
'Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, pp.95-100. 
86Ibid., Robert Moffat to Mary Moffat, 13 August 1823, p.107; ibid., Mary Moffat to 
James and Mary Smith, 1 Sept. 1823, p.109; Cope (ed.), Journals, p.190. 
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It was considered that the refugees might best be provided for under the 
supervision of the Griqua. However, since the Griqua seemed more concerned 
with the cattle they had gained than the people, Melvill applied for a share of the 
captured cattle, 'perceiving that the task of providing food might rest exclusively 
on him. Melvill was allotted thirty-three head of cattle87 and Hodgson, a 
Methodist missionary on visiting Griqua Town in July 18~3, alludes to them being 
used for the said purpose when he relates, 'Mr. Melvill sent off this morning to 
Graaf-Reinet fifteen females, some of whom I saw most eagerly eating the dung 
of the oxen killed for their support.'88 
Melvill is similarly unjustly charged of taking 'his customary cut of thirty cattle' 
in a 'raid' against Sefunela's Rolong in 1824.89 Cobbing's account is based on 
conjecture and misrepresents the contextual evidence. Melvill neither took the 
thirty cattle, nor can the events be construed as a raid.w 
With regard to the 'Mantatee' sent to Graaf-Reinet, it was claimed by Melvill that 
this was dope. with_llie_ pJisoners' best interests in mind. The Griqua were finding 
87Thompson, Travels, pp.176,177. 
88Cope (ed.), Journals, p.182. 
89Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.497. 
90For detail on the whole episode, see: Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, pp.145-
154,198-200,206; S. Broadbent, Narrative, pp.130-133,158,173; Cope '(ed.), Journals, 
pp.9,246,322; Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, p.167; Legassick, 'The Griqua, the 
Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp. 307-310,338. 
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it difficult to accommodate them in the face of a severe drought and dire food 
shortage. For some, there were just too many of them for whom to provide. On 
account of the harsh material conditions, but also fundamentally as a result of the 
indifferent and uncaring attitude of the Griqua, it would appear that the initial 
scheme for the 'Mantatee's' provision seemed to be thwarted. Melvill seriously 
believed, then, that they would be looked after best in the houses of the colonists. 
He wrote accordingly to the Landdrost at Graaf-Reinet, noting how 'badly off the 
'Mantatee' were amongst the Griqua.91 At the same time, Melvill understood the 
advantages of the refugees being used as labour in the colony.92 However, he 
n,ever intended them as a slave labour supply. His attempt to relocate the women 
and children in the Cape was ~_by-product and pragmatic end_ to the battle, and 
n()t its cause. Similarly, Moffat was at great pains to ensure that the six women 
and the boy he distributed in the colony - that is, the supposed 'slaves' that were 
the fruits of the 'raid' for Moffat93 - were well-cared for and that their freedom 
was guaranteed. He left two _of the women in the care of the fervent 
humanitarian, Dr. John Philip.94 
· 
91Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, Melvill 
to the Landdrost of Graaf-Reinet, 31 July 1823, p.226. See also Somerset to the 
Commissioners of Inquiry, p.227; Government Archives, Cape Town (hereafter CT): CO 
1/GR 16/12 Stockenstrom to Bird, 16 Oct. 1823. 
92Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, Melvill 
to the Landdrost of Graaf-Reinet, 31 July 1823, p.226. 
93Cobbing, 'The mfecane ·as alibi', p.493. 




It is interesting that the government was slow to respond to Melvill's pleas for the 
relief of the majority of the refugees. Such an influx of black refugees was hardly,' 
encouraged. Before Dithakong, a number of refugees had entered the colony, and 
had been forced to return beyond the limits of the frontier. Later, they were sent 
to mission stations, and it was only when the arrival of refugees became pressing, 
that a system of apprenticeship was introduced.95 It was · under pressure 
from Melvill, who related their starved condition and poor treatment by the 
Griqua, that the Governor conceded to the entry of the 'Mantatee' refugees.96 
Given the nature of their former frontier policies, it is difficult to suggest that 
both the colonial authorities and Melvill corresponded in the language of 'double 
talk', providing a smoke screen for their underlying slave deals. Once the system 
of apprenticeship was in place, however, it is possible that colonists, to an extent, 
used the cover of humanitarian_ aid for the 'Mantatee' to procure Af~-ic~p.}~?"()~r 
illicitly from either Bergenaars or white frontiersmen. The fact that the refugee 
apprenticed was usually situated in the hands of the person who delivered 
him/her, allowed for the abuse of the system and illegal seizures, similar to the 
practical workings of the San system of apprenticeship.97 In this context, the 
\,.~ 
I 
95CT:CO 1/GR 16/12 Stockenstrom to Fiervogel, 10 April 1823; ibid., Stockenstrom 
to Bird, 25 June 1823; 1/GR 8/12 Bird to Hallbeck, 24 April 1823; 1/GR 8/11 Bird to 
Stockenstrom, 4 Dec. 1822; Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the 
Native Inhabitants, Colonial Secretary to Landdrost of Graaf-Reinet, 27 August 1823, 
p.226; ibid., Somerset to the Commissioners of Inquiry, 4 Sept. 1823., p.226. 
96CT:CO 1/GR 16/12 Stockenstrom to Melvill, 12 Sept. 1823; ibid., Stockenstrom to 
Bird, 16 Oct. 1823. 




colonial government had little means of preventing such seizures from occurring. 
At the same time, it is important to take push factors into account as well, in 
consideration of the ravages of the Bergenaars from about 1824.98 But, although 
the first 'Mantatee' into the colony may be described as genuine refugees, it is 
' 
possible that many later arrivals were not. 
Further, the ammunition Melvill received need not be interpreted as payment for 
the refugees. Below is a portion of the letter from the Colonial Secretary to the 
Landdrost of Graaf-Reinet that alludes to the ammunition: 
Sir,- I have had the honour of submitting your letter of the 11th 
Instant with its enclosure from Mr. Melville to His Excellency the 
\ ·Governor. It appears to be desirable that Mr. Melville should be 
supplied with a larger portion of ammunition, than what had been 
sent to him at the period of your letter, and His Excellency does 
not imagine there will be any difficulty in so doing, now that it is 
understood that you can receive adequate supplies at Graham's 
Town.99 
98Much of the influx of southern-Sotho and Tswana from about 1824 must be 
ascribed to this source, rather than to the 'mfecane' and African agents from the east as 
held, for· example, by R. Elphick and V.C. Malherbe, 'The Khoisan to 1828', in R. 
Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), The Shaping of South African Society. 1652-1840, 2nd 
edition, Cape Town, 1989, p.43. It was invariably described in the indenture forms that 
the refugees had been beaten by Bastards rather than by other Africans. Of course, this 
may be interpreted in other ways. 
~eal, Records of the Cape Colony, 16, Bird to La'.nddrost of Graaf-Reinet, 27 Aug. 
1823, p.223. 
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Cobbing fails to mention the fact that Melvill was the government agent at 
Griqua Town. It is clear from this letter and from the instructions on his 
appointment as government agent that ammunition would be forwarded from the 
colony for the necessary administration of the territory.100 Bearing in mind that 
the supply of gunpowder had been exhausted since its distribution to the Griqua 
before the battle, it is understandable that more ammunition was needed for the 
protection of the area, especially in the face of further threatened raids from the 
'Mantatee', as well as from the Bergenaars, who continued to assert themselves 
in the ongoing civil war.101 On receiving the intelligence about the 'Mantatee' 
threat from Thompson and Melvill, the colonial authorities were quick to respond 
with the ammunition supply, as they were deeply distressed about the stability of 
the frontier region and feared that the colony would be overrun.102 To conclude 
that the acquisition of ammunition compounded a business transaction for the 
sale of slaves, is unwarranted and remains at best conjectural. 
As Eldredge argues, that Melvill should have implicated himself in the events at 
all by mentioning his acquiring of cattle and the distribution of the refugees, when 
he could have avoided any such discussion, seems to point towards the veracity 
100Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, 
Instructions to Melvill, 21March1822, p.212; ibid., report by Melvill, p.212. Ammunition 
was forwarded to give authority and ensure loyalty. See Legassick, 'The Griqua, the 
Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp. 183, 305. 
101 M. Kinsman, 'Populists and Patriarchs', p.11. 
102CT:CO 1/GR 16/12 Stockenstrom to Bird, 2 July 1823; ibid., Stockenstrom to 
Melvill, 12 Sept. 1823; Thompson, Travels, p.161. 
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of his account.103 In agreement with Moffat, Melvill's narrative on Dithakong 
commends itself trustworthy. The integrity of Melvill remains intact. 
George Thompson 
George Thompson was a Cape Town merchant, who was strongly influenced by 
'liberal' notions. As an energetic proponent of _free market ide9logy, Thompson 
continually called for the annihilation of slavery. His liberal commitment, along 
with the influence of Christian principles, meant that slavery went against his very 
being. However, according to the revisionists, at Dithakong, Thompson is 
implicated in the 'raid' for 'slaves' by acting as the spy seeking out the positions 
of the enemy104 and by handing over the gunpowder.105 
Thompson had undertaken a journey into the interior, and happened to arrive at 
the battle, but returned to the colony to give 'speedy information' with respect to 
the 'Manta tee' threat. The importance of Thompson's account lies in the fact that 
he established the reports about the existence of the 'Mantatee' by being an 
103See Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa', p.29. 
104Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.492. 
105Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.6,p.11. Gewald, however, is not explicit 
on Thompson. Either he deliberately planned the raid or was deceived. See ibid., ch.6, 
pp.8-11. Richner is not certain about Thompson's role and offers little explanation. 
Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', p.8. 
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eyewitness to their advance. Whilst war preparations were being made at 
Kuruman, he proceeded to Dithakong hoping to gain direct information about the 
numerous group. Finding Dithakong deserted, he pushed cautiously onwards 
before confronting the immense group in a valley below. He_ watched their 
advance on the old Dithakong site, before hurriedly returning to Kuruman, where 
he narrated what he had witnessed. Again, by situating Thompson within the 
confines of the ideologies that affected him, and by contextualising the above 
events, this section of the chapter will aim to present the dependability of 
Thompson's account. 
His ideological background 
Thompson arrived in southern Africa from England in 1818. Little is known of his 
English past. He opened a branch of a London mercantile house, and throughout 
his forty year stay in Cape Town was associated with the London firm, in which 
A.Borradaile was a partner. From incoming ships, his business sold European, 
Indian and Chinese goods of every description - merchandise, manufactured 
goods, staple goods, hats, shoes, dresses and so on.106 By 1822, Thompson had 
already travelled extensively through much of the colony in search of new business 
1a&rhe Cape Town Gazette, and African Advertiser, vol. xvii, 5 Jan. 1822, no.834; 2 
Feb. 1822, no.838; 27 Sept. 1823, no.924. For Thompson's background, see: W.J. de Kock 




Thompson may be termed a 'liberal'. He was involved in the circle of society that 
supported the ardent libertarians, Fairbairn and Pringle, and was engaged in many 
'liberal' pursuits. For example, he often petitioned for a free press and was a 
founder member of the Cape of Good Hope Temperance Society.108 
R.L. Watson describes liberalism in its classic form as involving several related 
concerns that mainly stem from the Enlightenment and the English Industrial 
Revolution. This included, 'the pursuit of individual freedom: the free 
dissemination of ideas through speech and publication, representative assemblies 
to check arbitrary political power, and free trade and the sanctity of private 
property.'109 This was the ideology by which Thompson was strongly influenced, 
and which he along with many British immigrants brought to the Cape. His ideas 
about individual freedom and a free market, which were establishing their 
hegemony over British society, are_ of particular importance for our purposes, for 
they bear largely on the way in which his views towards slavery would be shaped. 
The free market ideology strongly reflected nineteenth-century British liberalism 
107Tuompson, Travels, pp.vii,viii. 
108H.C. Botha, John Fairbairn in South Africa, Cape Town, 1985, pp.36,141. 
109R.L. Watson, 'Slavery and Ideology: The South African case', International Journal 
of African Historical Studies, 20, 1987, p.29. 
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and the demands of industrial capital. The conventional wisdom of Britain's 
commercial ruling classes followed the line of Adam Smith in his Wealth of 
Nations by affirming the superiority of free labour. It was believed that a coerc~g 
and immobile body of workers was economically irrational.110 Slave labour was - ·---- -- ·---··- -. --- -· -- ----
too expensive and uninventive. Rather, a free labour force encouraged to work 
by the incentive of wages was the path forward for the world's premier capitalist-
industrialising nation. Being a believer in laissez-faire principles, Thompson was 
a firm proponent of these ideals. He continually called for the annihilation of 
1-
slavery, since he was convinced that a free labour force was both cheaper and 
more efficient.111 
The call for the abolition of slavery was not merely economically motivated, but 
also inspired by British humanitarian anti-slavery movements, which were 
themselves strongly influenced by non-conformist _Christianity. The goal of ending 
slavery was not only a liberal and economically rational objective, then, but also 
a humane and moral one. Fundamentally, humanitarianism stressed the moral 
equality of all people. Abolitionists such as Wilberforce, Clarkson and Buxton, 
conveyed the principle that 'blacks were men and brothers', which itself derived 
from the Christian doctrine that all people possessed dignity and worth, and were 
110J.C. Armstrong and N. Worden, 'The slaves, 1652-1834', in R. Elphick and H. 
Giliomee (eds.), The Shaping of South African Society. 1652-1840, 2nd edition, Cape 
Town, 1989, p.164. 
111Thompson, Travels, pp.327,353,369. 
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equal before God by being created in His image.112 The evangelical worldview, 
therefore, nurtured sensitivity to the claims of liberty and to the call of benevolent 
measures. It fostered a spirit of responsibility and concern for the welfare of 
others.113 
Thompson was no less affected by these ideologies. He was strongly influenced 
by (::hristian notions, and .~aw the indigen_ous peoples _as fellmy~men.114 Clearly, 
the possibility of trading slaves was furthest from Thompson's mind. However, 
Cobbing appears to insinuate that such anti-slavery ideologies would not have 
precluded the 'fetching out' of 'free labour' beyond the frontier. 115 For 
Thompson, such a position is not easy to sustain. 
Although Thompson recognized the advantages of using African labour, he argued 
that they should be allowed to enter the colony voluntarily.116 The free market 
ideology, based on voluntary submission, worked against the 'smash-and-grab' 
1121. Walvin, England. Slaves and Freedom. 1776-1838, London, 1986, p.24. 
113For further discussion on the inseparability of these ideologies, see: S. Drescher, 
Capitalism and Antislavery, New York, 1987; A. du Toit and H. Giliomee, Afrikaner 
Political Thought: Analysis and Documents, Cape Town, 1983, ch.l; J. Gratus, The Great 
White Lie, London, 1973; Walvin, England. Slaves and Freedom; Watson, 'Slavery and 
Ideology'. 
114Thompson, Travels, pp.42, 108, 109,221-223,304,305. 
115Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.501,502. 
116Thompson, Travels, pp.410,411. 
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policy of primitive accumulation that Cobbing proposes.117 Morally, the extraction 
of 'free labour', forcibly gained through armed conduct, could scarcely have 
existed on Thompson's agenda. Christian morality deeply instilled in him a 
humane and philanthropic spirit, so fundamental to the anti-slavery crusade. 
While in the Roggeveld in 1824, Thompson was informed of the many 
commandoes made whereby numerous San were killed and their children forcibly 
taken into the colony as labour. Thompson was abhorred by what he described 
as 'these massacres', and by the coercive extraction of the children into 
servitude.118 A year earlier, he was also strongly condemnatory of the Boer 
commando at Tarka that had shot thirty San. He responded thus, 'This is certainly 
lamentable work, whatever be the cause of it, - that we should be under the 
necessity of hunting down our fellow-men like the wild beasts of the field '119 
(my emphasis). 
The· inseparability of his commitment to anti-slavery economic and moral 
objectives precluded Thompson from involvement in the forceable extraction of 
'free labour'. An examination of the 'positive' policy of the abolitionists' campaign 
further confirms this. Wilberforce, Clarkson and others saw the anti-slavery 
117See J.B. Peires, 'Matiwane's Road to Mbholompho: A Reprieve for the Mfecane?', 
paper prepared for The 'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new paradigm, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 6-9 Sept. 1991, pp.26-30. 
118Thompson, Travels, pp.221-223. For further instances of these notions, see ibid., 
pp. 327, 369. 
1191bid., p.42. 
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movement as both 'negative' and 'positive'. The 'negative' policy was simply 
directed at terminating the slave trade by persuading nations to cease the traffic. 
The 'positive' policy aimed at cutting off the trade at its source within Africa by 
promoting Christianity and legitimate commerce in Africa.120 It was believed 
that the British nation had been divinely sanctioned to bring to the 'heathen 
blacks', in their 'massive cultural deprivation', the imagined benefits of white 
Christian morality and civilization. By advocating legitimate commerce and 
Christianity, it was supposed that slavery would naturally be eliminated. The belief 
in the inherent superiority of white Christian civilization formed the basis of the 
'positive' policy. This policy not only explains Thompson's openness concerning 
the commercial objects of his journeys, as he sought to establish legitimate routes 
of commerce with the indigenous peoples, but further precludes him from 
'fetching out free labour'. Albeit condescending, he sincerely believed it to be the 
task of the English to teach the African the arts of civilization, commerce and 
Christianity. He considered this task 'noble and worthy', to be taught by 
example.121 His involvement in an armed raid would fundamentally militate 
against his beliefs in such a task. 
120Qratus, The Great White Lie, p.16. 
121Thompson, Travels, pp.108, 109,221,304,305. 
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His role in connection with Dithakong 
Thompson's journey of April-July 1823 to the eastern frontier and then to the 
neighbourhood of Kuruman was yet another pursuit that originated, in his own 
words, 'partly from motives of business, partly from the impulse of curiosity' .122 
Thompson was certainly not secretive about the objects of his travels and 
docume~ted his experiences in Travels and Adventures in Southern Afr~ca. 
That he was able to proceed beyond the frontier into the Transorangian region 
at all was the result of timely and favourable circumstances. Thompson 
understood that only 'should circumstances admit of it' would he be able to 
penetrate into the countries beyond the frontier. The Sneeuberg Mountains 
presented an insurmountable obstacle during the winter season, when the majority 
of farmers abandoned their homesteads for more accessible and warmer regions. 
Fortunately, Thompson's liberal acquaintance, Stockenstrom, Landdrost of Graaf-
Reinet, was about to proceed through this area accompa,nied by a land surveyor, 
a member of the Heemraden, and several wagons with tents and provisions, for 
the sake of inspecting lands to be granted to the hoers. Thompson was offered a 
place in the party without whose assistance, he perceived, he could not have 
journeyed further. 123 





Thompson's arrival at Griqua Town, therefore, can hardly be said to have been 
prearranged to coincide with Moffat's return from his shortened journey to the 
Ngwaketse. It was mere chance he proceeded at all. Nor was Kuruman the 
predetermined final destination of his exploration. The-news about the 'Manta tee' 
prevented Thompson from further progress into the interior. It appears his 
intention was to continue through to Delagoa Bay. Arend, a runaway slave who 
suggested he knew the route, stated that he would have accompanied Thompson 
but for the presence of the 'Mantatee'.124 
Whilst in the eastern Cape, having heard much about the upheavals in the interior 
from refugees in the Cradock area, 125 Thompson was anxious to gain specific 
information about the 'Mantatee' and so, whilst war preparations were being 
made, he set out for Dithakong.126 Gewald suggests that in his sighting of the 
'Mantatee' a few miles on from Dithakong, Thompson mistakenly identified a 
local community for the foreign group. His justification is a prime example of the 
way in which the revisionists exploit and deceive the non-specialist reader.127 
124Ibid., pp.89, 117. 
125Ibid., p.38. These upheavals were not necessarily the result of the 'Mantatee' at 
Dithakong. The refugees into the Cradock area themselves remarked that their land, to 
the north of the Tembu, had been overrun by 'a numerous and fierce nation' originating 
in the north and east. 
126For the following events surrounding Thompson's undertaking to Dithakong, see: 
ibid., pp.116-126; Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, p.90. 
127Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.6, pp.10,11. 
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He argues that it was not unusual for Dithakong to be found deserted. Campbell 
had been confronted with not a single person to be seen in any direction on his 
arrival in 1813. The reader is to infer that Thompson assumed incorrectly that 
Dithakong had been hastily abandoned, resulting in his later mistaken 
identification. Gewald, however, fails to inform the reader that although Campbell 
on his arrival thought Dithakong was deserted, he discovered the community 
gathered in a certain division of the town.128 Thompson, on the other hand, 
found Dithakong completely empty. 129 
Gewald further fails to disclose that Thompson watched, from a distance, the 
foreign group advance on the old Dithakong site, situated some kilometres from 
the existing town, from where he observed them 'rushing' into the few remaining 
houses like 'hungry wolves'. They soon detected Thompson's presence and, in 
order to escape their attempts to capture him, he made a hurried retreat to 
Kuruman.130 To be consistent, it seems plain that either Thompson was lying 
about everything he narrates, as Cobbing suggests, or he was stating the truth. 
128See J. Campbell, Travels in South Africa, Cape Town reprint, 1974, (originally 
London, 1815), p.180. 
129Thompson, Travels, pp.121,122. Having searched a number of huts, Thompson 
even fired a shot which usually brought a response, since the existence of a rifle meant 
the possibility of an animal kill and food. On this occasion, however, the sound of the 
gun brought no response. 
130Ibid., p.124. Note the illustration pertaining to Thompson's route, which makes for 
a realistic reading of the events, p.122. 
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Thompson never stayed for the battle. Having handed over his ten pounds of 
gunpowder to bring the collected amount to fifty pounds, which was believed to 
' be dreadfully insufficient, 131 he departed for the colony to warn the authorities, 
so that precautionary measures might be taken, lest the 'Mantatee' advance into 
the- colony.132 Leaving empty-handed, it remains to be demonstrated in what . 
way Thompson benefited from the 'raid'. 
Cobbing's conspiracy theory regarding Thompson, again, originates from silence. 
He fails to root his hypothesis in sound evidence. He does not demonstrate a 
scheming link with either Moffat, Melvill or the colonial authorities. Instead 
Thompson's account conforms to the ideological contours that shaped his 
character, and Qeing in agreement with Moffat and Melvill, presents itself reliable. 
Ultimately, the distinctive outworkings of each of the reporters' commitment to 
their . specific evangelical and liberal Weltanschauungen make for their 
presentation as slavers and outrageous liars no easy assignment. Their 
~ 31Ibid., pp.90, 135. 
132Ibid., pp.134, 135. 
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involvement m an armed raid would fundamentally militate against their 
adherence to the basic moral responsibilities of their worldviews, to which they 
held with remarkable consistency in both words and deeds for the rest of what has 
hitherto been known about their lives. Rather, their consistency of character, in 




3. THE ACTORS AT DITHAKONG 
In order to sustain further the accounts of the original reporters, this chapter will 
centre upon the major actors, and examine their identity and motives for 
engagement. The 'Mantatee', the Griqua and the TlhaJ>ing constitute the major 
. ~-, ~ ·---·-·-··-· -- ~ .- ·-,.,.-"....,,.-,,---0-_- __ .,,,.-=------ ·- --·----=--o..d 
participants. In the past, the 'Mantatee' have been described as the desperate 
protagonists, and the role of the Griqua and Tlhaping has been depicted as 
defensive and protective. The revisionists, however, tend to contrive identities and 
motives for the actors that are compatible with Dithakong-as-raid, but their 
methodology to this end remains highly suspect. 
\, 
,·Tuey marshal! the evidence to suit their own purposes. Statements are made that 
'· (\Y,7 
. >. ·are often founded upon a very tenuous basis, under which circumstances it should 
be incumbent on the historian to discuss the quality of the evidence and its 
context. Sources that contradict their claims are withheld and ignored .. A 
preoccupation with white agency and white sources r_esults in the failure to 
consider African oral traditions. Generalisations characterize their work, with 
little sensitivity to detail. Reflection upon contextualisation is uncareful. 
Periodisation is often loose, as they project later evidence backwards to account 
for earlier times. The evidence documented tends to be circumstantial rather than 
direct. In all, their practice presents itself as highly questionable. 
This chapter will further attempt to reveal the methodological incongruities of the 
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revisionist critiques by closely contextualising the nature, identity and motives of 
the participants, and by examining evidence external to the accounts of the 
original reporters, in order to establish the traditional version of events. 
The 'Mantatee' 
The nature and identity of the 'Mantatee' is crucial to the present debate on 
Dithakong. The revisionists tend to suppose that the 'Mantatee' were 'mythical 
beings' invented as an alibi for the raid. Indeed, according to them, it was the 
local community at Dithakong, who were the unfortunate and innocent people 
attacked. The _original reporters, however, were certainly e.!!!Qh(!t_i(; __ a_l>q_l!__t th_e 
- ~~~st~_nce_ of a fo~~i~n ~-g~- ~~E~~tening_peop_le. Moffat, for example, noticed how 
distinctively they contrasted with the Tswana of his area in dress, ornaments, 
'<:·~--= = ~ - ~~ • --·---o~ -- ' ""'"--'-'--...,.==-- - •- ~_,,...,_ r- -- • - -- ~ -· ~ -·~- • ·--- -- -- • -
~eapons and beh~viour. _This section of the chapter will aim to establish their 
reports about the foreign group. 
The original accounts 
For many months prior to the confrontation at Dithakong, there had been 
numerous~rµrno11~~- _concerning the ~dvanc_e of-~- vast_~~ll_d ~estitute migratory 
gr2_up, which had destroyed many communities in its .e_ath. The foreign group had 
1 come from the east and its fighting men were depicted as 'long-breathed and 
~-~'-· ~·-~---=--=-~-- ·-·.·- . -~--.,------- --- • - ' 
\ 
i strong runners, [who] use no spears and guns, but fight with a knob-stick, and use 
·c._. 
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a weapon like a sickle.' They were described as not being adapted to war, but 
, were more like 'hungry wolves', whose object appeared 'not so much to war, as 
/_to devour the produce of the land of which they [got] possession.'1 · 
Moff(l_t,_ h_owever, was not convinced by the reports and cotginued with his 
intendedj9_ur_n_~y to the Ngwaketse.2 But he ~1! _h_astily_!etur_ned_~o Kurum_~12· 
£9nvinced about the_!.hreaten_ing advaf!ce of th~ foreign_gr._oup. 3 What accounts 
for his sudden change of attitude? Cobbing believes Moffat turned back on the 
basis of 'unsubstantiated rumours.'4 But he fails to disclose that, en route, Moffat 
continually ignored advice not to pursue his journey for fear of being destroyed 
by the 'Mantatee'. In the initial stages of his journey, Moffat was not persuaded 
by the rumours and remained sceptical. Many of the accounts were monstrous, 
and Moffat perceived the Tswana to be prone to lies and exaggerated reporting.5 
. 
1Moffat, Missionazy Labours, p.340; Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat 
to James and Mary Smith, 12 April 1823, p.73; ibid, Robert Moffat, journal, 16 May 
1823, p.77; ibid, 17 May 1823, p.78. 
2For reasons for his journey, see: ibid., Robert Moffat, journal, 14 May 1823, 
pp.75,76; Moffat, Missionary Labours, pp.340,341. 
3For Moffat's account of his journey, see: Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert 
Moffat, journal, 14 May 1823 - 3 June 1823, pp.75-87. 
4Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.492. 
5Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 16 May 1823, pp.77,78; 17 
May 1823, p.78; 20 May 1823, p.80. 
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However, as he drew clos~r to_the S~l;l!_Ces of conflict, he became incr_5??singly 
affected __ by_.!_l!~ cor_I~ergence of i~or1!13:I]ts' __ acco_unts from a ~ange of diffc:rent 
groups. It was confirmed that the 'Mantatee' had originated in the south·east and 
~ . - . . ' ------------
firstl~~~ta_cke_d the '_Goya'. They had then proceeded northwards and defeated 
) . many towns east of Kaditshwene, including Sefunela's Seleka·Rolong at Thabeng 
, and Kgasane's Kwena·Modimosana. Advancing west:Wards, they had driven 
\ Makaba's Ngwaketse from their town, but they had counterattacked and forced 
i 
1 the 'Mantatee' to .retreat. The foreign group had since taken a southern route, 
and attacked the Ratlou and Tshidi sections of the Rolong, under Gonntse and 
Tawana respectively.6 Finally, at Nokaneng, having heard the eyewitness accounts 
I 
J of three Rolong deputies, who had but recently been engaged in battle at 
Khunwana, !\:!Qff~t.became ~0!1.Y_i~ced of their ominous p_.!:esence. Although he had 
not witnessed the foreign group at first hand, he believed, through the 
convergence of historical probability, with particular respect to the eyewitness 
reports of the Rolong deputies, that their existence was established beyond 
doubt.7 (see map 1) 
' 6For information from the inhabitants of Dithakong, Mahumoapelo, the Maidi chief 
at Nokaneng, the Kgalagadi, servants of the Rolong at Mosita, and the Rolong deputies 
at Nokaneng respectively, see: ibid., 16 May 1823, pp.77,78; ibid., 17 May 1823, p.78; 
ibid., 26 May 1823, pp.83,84; ibid., 31 May 1823, pp.85,86. 
7Moffat would report to the Tihaping that the 'Mantatee' presence was 'well-
authenticated', ibid., 5 June 1823, p.87. Similarly, although he had been previously 
sceptical, on hearing the first-hand accounts of the Rolong deputies, Mahumoapelo, too, 
became convinced of the 'Mantatee' threat and sought advice from Moffat in the face 
of danger, ibid., 17 May 1823, p.78; 31 May 1823, pp.85,86. 
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Having returned to Kuruman, reports continued to monitor the advance of the 
'Mantatee'. After Khunwana, they were described to have moved onward to 
Nokaneng, from where Moffat had but recently fled. It was reported that 
Mahumoapelo's Maidi had hastily abandoned the town.8 During this time of 
anxious anticipation, Kuruman was a hive of activity marked by chaos and 
. pandemonium. Preparations for battle were made, cattle were collected, valuables 
were buried and wagons were prepared to flee. 9 Moffat certainly went to great 
lengths to embellish his narrative if his account was a concoction and there was, 
in fact, no foreign group to fear. It was in this context of suspense and uncertainty 
that Thompson made his journey to Dithakong, the vicinity in which he observed 
the numerous group advance from Nokaneng. Having been an ~ewitness to their 
~J>roach on.Dithakqng, Thompson hurriedly fled to Kuruman. 
In order to prevent scenes of bloodshed and destruction at Kuruman, it was 
considered best to confront the 'Mantatee' at a distance from the homes of their 
wives and children.10 Arr!y!~g __ ~t. _:PJt~~~~.n:1:g on _15 _ .Ju_ne 1823, the _war p~rty 
sight~~ ~?_e}()reigri .group, a vast aggregation estimated at_l_Qr_ty _tQJif!Y_Jpousand, 
as compared to the local population of Dithakong, which was estimated at six to 
8Thompson, Travels, pp.107,114. 
9Ibid., pp.115, 116. 







Concerned to ascertain the identity of the people, Moffat 
/ 
approached a woman in a ravine, from whom he discovered that they had come 
from a distant country. Fearing the disastrous effects of war, Moffat attempted to 
secure a peace treaty, but was rushed upon, and forced to retreat by the 
aggressive and desperate foreigners. With the hopes of peace frustrated, on 26 
~, June 1823, the combined Griqua/Tlhaping party advanced to within 150 yards of 
"-- ·the foreigners, from where they were descended upon, and the hostilities 
began.12 
Both Moffat and Melvill described the nature and apQearance of the 'Mantatee' 
·- --,....,_--- - ~ ·~ . -~·---- --" -~ . --..,---=--·~ ~ ··---------· -~ ~- - -- . - ~ 
as c~n!rasting s~arply with the T§wana of their_ regi_op.._ Their dress, ornaments, 
and weapons were distinctive from the Tswana. They wore black ostrich feathers 
on their heads and large copper rings around their necks, arms, legs and ears. 
Their shields were large and oval, and they possessed spears, javelins, battle-axes, 
clubs, and something like a sickle, as had been reported. Moffat depicted them 
as 'a much more barbarous people ..... rude and savage in the extreme.'13 Clearly 
the original reporters were convinced amongst themselves about the existence of 
a vast, foreign and threatening group at Dithakong on 26 June 1823. Certainly, 
11Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 26 June 1823, p.95; 
Thompson, Travels, p.121. 
12For the events, see: Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 25,26 
May 1823, pp.91,92. 
13Ibid., Robert Moffat, journal, 26 June 1823, p.95; Thompson, Travels, pp.165,170-
172. 
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by this date, the rumours of the 'Mantatee' presence had been substantiated for 
them. 
The recent accounts 
. The revisionists agree amongst themselves that there existed no vast and destitute 
'mfecane' migratory group at Dithakong. The 'Mantatee' were 'invented beings' 
created as cover for the raid.14 Rather the local community at Dithakong were 
the innocent victims of the hostilities. Cobbing is uncertain as to the precise 
identification of those at Dithakong. The fact that the place had been a Maidi 
residence, prior to 1823, suggests to him that they were the ones attacked, but 
Moffat mentions Hurutse women amongst the prisoners as well, which indicates 
to Cobbing that they, too, were victims. For Richner, the innocent involved 
included the Maidi, Hurutse and Kwena. For Gewald, it was the Maidi and 
Rolong-Mariba.15 
14Cobbing and Richner certainly suggest this. See Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', 
p.514; Richner, 'The withering. away of the "lifaqane"', p.9. With little basis, Gewald 
suggests the 'Mantatee' might have been the Bergenaars, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', 
ch.8, p.4. 
15See: Cobbing, 'The mfecane as .alibi', p.514; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane"', p.8; Gewald, ~"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.7, p.1. 
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Reasons for their non-existence 
Alternative forces 
A number of factors have led to these conclusions. Firstly, it is believed that the 
¥uRheavals to t!:Je nor!.,h.:;,east of Kuruman, in the months leading up to Dithakong, 
i -- -- - -- ____ :;;w --~ 
can be explained without reference to the existence of the foreign group. For 
Cobbing, this is demonstrated in terms of Koranna-Taung-Griqua attacks.16 
Gewald seems to hold the Bergenaars responsible.17 Cobbing attempts to show 
continuity of such dislocations caused before and after Dithakong. However, this 
interpretation reveals critical shortcomings in periodisation. The majority of 
examples are drawn from the post-Dithakong period, the impact and extent of 
which are well established. However, in the years prior to Dithakong, there is 
evidence only of occasional deprivations in this region by certain Griqua and 
frontier ruffians that were sporadic and transitory. 
16Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.496-498. Richner, on the other hand, argues 
that such forces as the Griqua, Bergenaars and Koranna did not reach this region of the 
Rolong, Hurutse and Ngwaketse until after mid-1824. See Richner, 'The withering away 
of the "lifaqane"', pp.5,6. 
17Gewald, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.8, pp.2-4. The fact that the earliest 
rumours reported people of yellow complexion amongst the 'Mantatee' suggests to 
Gewald that the 'Mantatee' were indeed Bergenaars. In his latest articles, Cobbing, on 
the other hand, uses such tenuous evidence to suggest that the Portugese were raiding 
to the north of Dithakong in the early 1820's. Neither of these conflicting conclusions is 
the most reasonable to draw. For a full discussion, see note 60 of this section on the 
'Mantatee'. See also J. Cobbing, 'Ousting the Mfecane: Reply to Elizabeth Eldredge', 
pp.29-30; 'Rethinking the Roots of Violence in southern Africa, c.1790-1840', pp.12-13, 
papers prepared for The 'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new paradigm, University of 
the Witwatersrand, 6-9 Sept. 1991. 
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In the months prior to Dithakong, when the first reports about the devastations 
of the 'Mantatee' were being received, Cobbing can only produce one example 
of a Koranna-Taung-Griqua attack, which lacks little substance in itself. The 
example involves the Koranna raiding the Hurutse at Kaditshwene in 1822-3. 
Nowhere in his footnotes is their given explicit reference to this attack.18 
Similarly, Gewald, whose analysis is largely idiosyncratic, fails to give strong 
validation to his suggestions.19 The revisionists have yet to demonstrate their 
opinions convincingly. 
The composition of the grouping 
The second reason for their conclusions relates to the great confusion 
surrounding the composition of the 'Mantatee'. Since Moffat, Melvill and 
Thompson referred to the vast 'horde' as the 'Mantatee', many have identified 
MaNtatisi's Tlokwa of the Vaal-Caledon region as the group at Dithakong. 
Earliest writers of African history such as Theal, Stow and Ellenberger, all 
succumbed to this interpretation.20 However, Marian How has since 
18Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.497,514, notes 54 and 141. 
19Many of Gewald's assertions concerning the role of the Bergenaars in this period 
and region ·are inferred, and introduced in his concluding chapter. His evidence is 
circumstantial. See Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.8, pp.3,4. 
2°Theal, History of South Africa, p.442. Theal did, however, recognise that the 
'Mantatee horde' was composed of many different groups, which included the Tlokwa. 
Stow, The Native Races of South Africa, p.460; Ellenberger, History of· the Basu to, 
pp.136-139. . 
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convincingly shown that the Tlokwa never crossed west of the Vaal.21 Cobbing 
and Richner have therefore tended to draw the neat conclusion that there was no 
massive group west of the Vaal.22 The '~fantatee' were merely 'inv~nt~cl beings.' 
Curiously, this was ~ither the conclusion of How nor subsequent histori~ns such 
as Lye, <?mer-Cooper, Schapera and Legassick.23 On the testimony of the 
original reporters, these historians determined that Dithakong was in fact overrun 
by a foreign migratory group, who were not in the first place 'Mantatee'. Moffat, 
for example, wrote on the testimony of the prisoners that they themselves 
disclaimed the appellation of 'Mantatee' given to them. Instead, he was informed 
that they consisted of a mixture of peoples, comprising essentially the 'Maputee' 
and the 'Batclaquan', under the chiefs 'Chaane' and 'Carrahanye' respectively.24 
Thompson was similarly informed. On his return to Cape Town, he confronted a 
21M. How, 'An alibi for Mantatisi.', African Studies, 13, 2, 1954, pp.65-76. 
22Gewald entirely avoids these questions. 
23Lye, 'The Difaqane', pp.107-131; Omer-Cooper, The· Zulu Aftermath, pp.86-98; 
Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, p. xxiv; Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and 
the Missionaries', pp. 328-341. 
24Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat, journal, 21 July 1823, pp. 102,103. 
All of the references in Schapera used in this thesis have been checked from copies of 
' originals in the National Archives of Zimbabwe located at the U.C.T. Archives - BCS 36 
D75/55, BZA 80/87-80/90 - to counter Gewald's argument that Moffat's original 
documents have been significantly altered with regard to 'mfecane' -related passages. 
Schapera's transcriptions used here can be relied upon, who also directly noted 
differences between the original documents and later versions. Gewald's example of an 
important alteration derives from the Matabele Journals of Moffat, Salisbury, 1976, 
edited by Wallis, who did not consider differences between the originals and published 
forms. See Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, p.75; Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', 
ch.6, p.8. 
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,. Rolong refugee at Griqua Town, who had fled the interior. The man had been 
) 
( driven from his territory by invaders he called 'Batcloqueene', under chiefs 
l 'Malahanye' and another he could not recall.25 . 
Whereas Gewald just ignores this evidence, Cobbing and Richner are quick to 
dismiss it. How and subsequent historians have translated Moffat and Thompson's 
references as the Phu thing of Tsuane and the Hlakoana of Nkharahanye. This was 
substantiated on the basis of Ellenberger's independent identification of these 
groups under the said leaders in his History of the Basuto, long considered the 
main source of Sotho oral tradition.26 In a short footnote, without explanation, 
Cobbing proposes that such a conclusion is 'extremely dubious' and 
'unwarranted'.27 Both Cobbing and Richner believe Ellenberger's information 
to be derived from Moffat's sources. Richner goes so far as to say that since there 
is little other independent evidence for the existence of such groups, they can be 
safely rejected.28 But, conforming to the consensus of the day, Ellenberger 
placed MaNtatisi's Tlokwa at Dirhakong. Surely if he had obtained his 
information from Moffat's sources, he would rather have identified the Phuthing 
and Hlakoana at Dithakong? Clearly, he had been informed by old men of the 
25Thompson, Travels, p.137. 
26Ellenberger, History of the Basu to, pp.34-37, 70-72, 121, 351. Although many of his 
evidences derive from oral traditions, Ellenberger also used documentary sources. He did 
not always note his sources, which makes it difficult, at times, to critique his work. 
27Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.516, note 154. 
28Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', p.9. 
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groups about the existence of the Phuthing and Hlakoana under Tsuane and 
Nkharahanye respectively, but had not been specifically told that they were 
represented at Dithakong. Interestingly, on the testimony of Setaki, son of 
Nkharahanye, he placed the Phuthing and Hlakoana across the Vaal at this time, 
where they suffered a great defeat.29 
Ellenberger, himself, harboured grave doubts whether the Tlokwa had ever 
crossed the Vaal, and became convinced that the Phuthing and Hlakoana were 
at Dithakong. Regrettably, he did not have the opportunity to pursue further 
sources in order to corroborate his own opinions, and, thereby, contradict 
historians of the day such as Theal. 30 Of course, had Ellenberger had access to 
Moffat's private journals, he would have been provided with the ideal and 
' 
necessary proof. 31 
Interestingly, in his latest article, Cobbing has since found it necessary to refute 
Ellenberger's identifications in an exhaustive critique, where his arguments take 
29Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, p.139. 
30How, 'An alibi for Mantatisi', p.75. 
31Although the relevant sections of Moffat's private journals were printed in a 
London Missionary Society publication, Ouarterly Chronicle of Transactions, 3, London, 
1829, and his public memoirs, published in Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern 
Africa of 1842, mentioned the chiefs though not the names of the foreign groups at 
Dithakong, it appears that Ellenberger had either no access to them or overlooked the 
references to prove his ideas. It was only through the publication of Moffat's private 
journals and letters in Schapera's Apprenticeship at Kuruman of 1951 that the consensus 
of the day changed, as to who was represented at Dithakong. 
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a more definitive shape.32 For the reason that this thesis primarily constitutes a 
response to Cobbing's 'The mfecane as alibi', his latest re-examination will not be 
dealt with in depth. Many of his arguments hinge on the same assumption that 
Ellenberger derived his information from Moffat. He recognises the existence of 
the 'shadowy' groups, the Phuthing and Hlakoana, yet maintains that on the basis 
of Moffat's sources, believing the 'Maputee' to be his Phuthing and the 
'Batclaquan' to be his Hlakoana, Ellenbe~ger fictionally inserted the leaders 
Chaane and Carrahanye (polished up into Tsuane and Nkharahanye respectively), 
and placed the groups in the fictional passages dealing with the northern Cape 
region. Cobbing argues the fact that no chief Tsuane or Nkharahanye appears in 
Ellenberger's genealogies, suggests their fictional nature. Further, that Ellenberger 
did not mention the presence of the Hlakoana and Phuthing west of the Vaal in 
the sections that centred on the groups, and only in passages related to the 
northern Cape, indicates to Cobbing that the groups were fictionally inserted in 
the latter sections. 
Of course, the question remains why Ellenberger did not place the Phuthing and 
Hlakoana at Dithakong if he was deriving his sources from Moffat. The following 
remarks can also be made in response to Cobbing's latest arguments. Firstly, 
Ellenberger explicitly stated that Tsuane was not a chief of the Phuthing, but 
32Since Eldredge made similar observations concerning the identification of the 
'Mantatee' by the original reporters and subsequent historians, Cobbing no longer 
suppresses this evidence, which has led to his exhaustive critique. See Cobbing, 'Ousting 
the Mfecane', pp.26-31. 
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rather a powerful uncle of the chief, Ratsebe. For this reason, he does not appear 
in the Phuthing genealogy. Tsuane appears to have gained a strong following by 
absorbing Nkharahanye's section of the Hlakoana.33 Further, Nkharahanye does 
not appear in Ellenberger's Hlakoana genealogy, for the reason that his section 
of the Hlakoana was a minority group that had seceded, later to be absorbed by 
the Phuthing. Ellenberger remarked that several chiefs had been omitted from the 
-
Hlakoana genealogy as a result of the group being so divided.34 As a leader of 
a minority group, perhaps later to lose its identity, it is not unreasonable that 
Nkharahanye does not appear. 
Secondly, apart from the fact that Ellenberger explicitly stated that he received 
information about the advance of the Phuthing and Hlakoana west of the Vaal 
from oral sources, the reason for not alluding to this in the sections that dealt 
with the groups themselves, relates to the divisions into which Ellenberger 
arranged his book. He divided his book into three sections, the first of which 
concerned the ancient history of the Sotho up to approximately 1822. The second 
period described the 'Lifaqane Wars' which Ellenberger had beginning around 
33Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, pp.36,71. Ellenberger also identifies the chief 
'Motsoane' in his Phuthing genealogy as the father of Ratsebe. On the basis of oral 
tradition, MacGregor makes similar references. Whether 'Motsoane', the father of 
Ratsebe, and Tsuane, the uncle of Ratsebe, are the same person is difficult to know. 
Although Ellenberger places the rule of 'Motsoane' from 1780-1800, it is possible that 
his reign extended over a later period. Ellenberger was only too aware of the inaccuracy 
of his dates, as he constructed them on a partially artificial basis: See ibid., 
pp.333,350,351; J.C. MacGregor, Basuto Traditions, Cape Town, 1905, p.43. 
34Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, pp.71,385,386. 
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1822. Ellenberger situated the Phuthing and Hlakoana sections in the first period, 
which only dealt with their history up to 1822, at the time when they resided in 
the Vaal-Caledon region. Considering that they only moved west of the Vaal in 
1822-3, for this reason, Ellenberger did not mention them in the northern Cape 
until the second section on the 'Lifaqane Wars'.35 
It would seem that Ellenberger arrived at his information independently and from 
oral sources. Indeed, in agreement with Cobbing, the existence of the Phuthing 
and Hlakoana cannot be denied. Today their descendants dwell in Lesotho.36 A 
number of further oral testimonies point to their involvement at Dithakong. From 
old men of the Phuthing at Leribe, D.F. Ellenberger's son, Rene, confirmed that 
'Tsooane, chief of the Maphuthing, was killed by Makulukama (Coloured people, 
Griquas) in a fearful fight beyond the Vaal River.'37 Rev. Daumas, writing on 
behalf of Moletsane, chief of the Taung in the 1820's, documented that Tsuane 
and his people were defeated near Dithakong by the Griqua.38 Breutz in the 
35Ibid.,pp.viii,34-37,70-72,139. See also Cobbing, 'Ousting the Mfecane', pp.28,30 
(Concerning his final reference in note 186, one can hardly expect mention of their 
advance westwards here. This involves one section of the Hlakoana under Lepheana 
focusing on specific events in a narrow period of time.). 
36Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa', p.26. 
37How, 'An alibi for Mantatisi', p.68. 
38G.M. Theal, Basutoland Records, vol.I, Cape Town, 1883, p.517. Notice Daumas 
writes, 'Tsuane, Chief of the Bafokeng (who were improperly confounded with the 
Mantatis).' R. Ellenberger thought that Daumas either misunderstood Moletsane, for he 
knew little Basu to history, or he cut Moletsane short. Instead of speaking of the Fokeng 
of Sebetwane and the Phu thing of Tsuane, he joined them. R. Ellenberger was led to this 
conclusion for there has never existed a Fokeng chief called Tsuane. See How, 'An alibi 
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1940's indicated from Kwena-Modimosana oral traditions that they remembered 
the 'BaTlhakwane' war of 1823-4.39 The Hurutse also recalled the advance of the 
'BaTlhakwane' through their territory.40 In addition, on 3 October 1857, on a 
visit to Mzilikazi, Moffat was introduced to a foreigner who, on enquiry, was 
found to be one of 'Chuane's people' defeated at Dithakong. The man mentioned 
that three great chiefs had fa.llen that day, namely, 'Chuane, Kharaganye and 
another.'41 That Moffat was securing his alibi created thirty-four years previously, 
certainly requires a stretch of the imagination. 
The only other recorded material by inhabitants of the zone of conflict during this 
period was that of Hodgson and Broadbent, pioneer missionaries into the upper-
Vaal region.42 Lye has shown that their accounts, taken from a different 
perspective, dovetail favourably with Moffats' with respect to the approach and 
retreat of the numerous and desperate group.43 Journeying up the Vaal towards 
the beginning of 1823 with the purpose of settling a mission amongst Sefunela's 
Rolong, they encountered Koranna and Rolong fleeing from wars, reportedly 
for Mantatisi', p.75. 
39P.L. Breutz, The Tribes of Rustenburg and Pilansberg Districts, 28, Pretoria, 1953, 
p.430. 
40P.L. Breutz, The Tribes of Marica District, 31, Pretoria, 1953, p.7. 
41J.P.R. Wallis (ed.), The Matabele Journals of Robert Moffat, 2, London, 1945, p.81. 
42Cope (ed.), Journals, pp.101-190; Broadbent, Narrative, pp. 20-77; W. Shaw (ed.), 
Memoirs of Mrs. A Hodgson, London, 1836, ch.7. 
43Lye, 'The Difaqane', pp.112,123-129. 
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raging furiously amongst the Tswana. It was related that a 'Caffres commando' (or 
'Naked Caffres'), very numerous and ferocious, was in motion against the Tswana, 
coming from.an area beyond the 'Goyas' up the Vet River.44 
\ 
Interestingly, at the end of January, Hodgson and Broadbent encountered a 
' number of armed men whom they believed were part of the 'Caffres commando'. 
They observed them wearing black ostrich feathers on their heads and as having 
large, oval shields, which were distinct from that of the Rolong, whose were 
square and hollowed on both sides. Moffat and Melvill described the 'Mantatee' 
at Dithakong in a similar way.45 After February, little was seen or heard about 
the 'Caffres commando', until June when reports filtered in again.46 
Towards the end of July, substantive reports arrived about the approach of the 
'Caffres commando', this time from a westerly direction. Sefunela fled with his 
people from Matlwase, arguing that 'it would be madness to hazard a battle, they 
are too strong for us.'47 Clearly the foreign group remained vast in retreat, and 
indicates that they were no local community driven into flight from Dithakong. 
In reviewing their origin, Sefunela could not learn from what nation they had 
44Cope (ed.), Journals, pp.98,101,102,108. 
45Ibid., pp.120, 121; Broadbent, Narrative, pp.34,35. See also note 13 of this section 
on the 'Manta tee'. 
46Cope (ed.), Journals, pp.175,179. 
47Broadbent, Narrative, pp.64,65. 
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come. They were an unknown entity to him.48 Hodgson, Sefunela and his son, 
Moroko, also reported seeing small parties of stragglers in a desperate plight, 
even feeding upon their own dead.49 On 9 August, Sefunela returned to 
Matlwase satisfied that the 'Caffres commando' had retreated up the Vaal (see 
map 1). 
The earliest reports, received independently by Moffat, also described the advance 
of the 'Mantatee' towards the 'Goya', before proceeding northwards. During the 
months March to May, when Hodgson and Broadbent heard little about the 
'Caffres commando', Moffat had the 'Mantatee' moving in a north-westerly 
direction before having them continue southwards, when reports were received 
at Matlwase once more. Finally, his depiction of their retreat to the Vaal during 
July and early August,50 confirms Sefunela's removal from Matlwase. 
Interestingly, on learning about the battle at Dithakong from both Moffat, Melvill 
and the refugees, Hodgson immediately associated all that he knew about the 
'Caffres commando' with the 'Mantatee'.51 This seemed a reasonable elision to 
make given the timing of their parallel movements, their size, and their foreign 
48Cope (ed.), Journals, p.179. They were neither Koranna nor Taung, for he had 
knowledge about these communities, often referring to them as distinct entities. 
49lbid., pp.184,189; Broadbent, Narrative, p.67. 
50Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to Mary Moffat, 13 August 1823, 
pp.106,107; ibid., Mary Moffat to James and Mary Smith, 1 Sept. 1823, pp.108,109. 
51Cope (ed.), Journals, p.179. Similarly, when Broadbent came to write his book, he 
associated the 'Caffres commando' with the 'Mantatee'. See Broadbent, Narrative, 
pp.27,31,34, etc. 
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and plundering nature. Although a number of historians have perhaps been a 
little too quick to identify the precise nature of movement and composition of the 
'Caffres commando' prior to Dithakong,52 it seems difficult to deny, at least, the 
existence of the vast foreign group in retreat from Dithakong eastwards towards 
Matlwase. 
The contemporary evidence appears to confirm the existence of the foreign 
group,53 consisting primarily of the Phuthing and Hlakoana. Although the 
52See for example, M. Kinsman, 'The Impact of the Difaqane on Southern Tswana 
Communities, with special reference to the Rolong', History Workshop, 1984, p.7. At the 
same time, some of the conclusions by certain revisionists are just as emphatic and 
unjustified. For example, Gewald and Lambourne argue, on a very tenuous basis, that 
the Rolong were not fleeing the 'Caffres commando' at Thabeng early in 1823, but rather 
the Bergenaars. Their piece of evidence is limited, indirect and open to many different 
readings. It involves a small section of Rolong under Sefunela's brother, Tshabidi~a, who, 
having removed from Thabeng, had since heard the sound of guns at one of the places 
where they had later encamped. This suggests to Gewald and Lambourne that the 
Bergenaars moved the Rolong. But the Bergenaars were not the only group with 
firearms. Both the Koranna and Rolong possessed a few guns. It is difficult to know to 
whom the guns belonged, since it is not stated. The reference could even have related 
to a minor conflict between Tshabidira and the Koranna with whom he was connected. 
By no means does this necessarily negate the existence of the 'Caffres commando'. This 
event would appear to have occurred after the major retreat of the· Rolong from 
Thabeng, ·which the Rolong explicitly stated
1 
was the result of the advance of the 'Caffres 
commando'. See Gewald, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatee', ch.6, p.3, ch.8, pp.3,4; B. 
Lambourne, 'A Chip off the Old Block: Early Ghoya History and the Emergence of 
Moletsane's Taung', paper prepared for The 'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new 
paradigm, University of the Witwatersrand, 6-9 Sept. 1991, p.7, note 41; Cope (ed.), 
Journals, pp.108-111, 147, 152, 154, 163. · 
53Note that Griqua oral tradition also recoµnts uniform reference to a foreign group 
that came and warred over the African nations of their· quarter. See Evidence Taken at 
Bloemhof Before the Commission Appointed to Investigate the Claims of the South 
African Republic. Captain N. Waterboer. Chief of West Griqualand. and Certain Other 
Native Chiefs. to Portions of the Territory on the Vaal River. Now Known As the 
Diamond Fields, Cape Town, 1871, evidence of Kruger, pp.4,7,8; evidence of Jansen, 
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original reporters do not mention them, there does exist a small amount of 
evidence to suggest Se_betwane's Fokeng of Patsa was also represented at 
Dithakong. Livingstone learnt from Sebetwane, shortly before the latter's death, 
that his people had been part of the vast group driven back by the Griqua from 
Kuruman in 1824.54 The reference would appear to relate to Dithakong, but is 
open to interpretation. Ellenberger also situated the Fokeng of Patsa in the 
neighbourhood of Dithakong.55 Perhaps Sebetwane was the forgotten third 
chief? It is difficult to know with any certainty.56 Moffat did, however, note that 
p.12. 
540. Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, London, 1857, 
p.84. . 
55Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, p.137. Ellenberger even describes a battle 
involving the Patsa at Dithakong a few days before 26 June. In this case, it is difficult to 
know from where he derived his information. He does, however, relate that the Fokeng 
chief, Ramabusetsa, joined Sebetwane and was present at Dithakong, and the vernacular 
history, Dico tsa Secwana, does also mention that Makaba was attacked at Tlhorong by 
Ramabusetsa early in 1823. See E.W. Smith, 'Sebetwane and the Makololo', African 
Studies, 15, 2, 1956, p.58. 
56Much concerning the Patsa is open to speculation. In his latest articles, Cobbing 
argues that the 'known facts' about the Patsa migration path rule against them being near 
Dithakong. He relates that they first fled eastwards, 'probably' from the Griqua or 
'perhaps' the Taung. They then came into contact with Portugese slavers, 'perhaps 
somewhere' in the modern Fouriesberg-Bethlehem area. From there the survivors 
crossed the southern, central and western Transvaal towards the Molepolole area via an 
'unknown migration path'. The very language Cobbing uses, suggests that his 'known 
facts' are not well established. It is difficult to demonstrate that either the Griqua or the 
Taung moved the Patsa groups eastwards from their homelands near modern Virginia. 
There is mention of the Fokeng chiefs, Sebetwane and Ramabusetsa, coming into contact 
with slavers, but the evidence suggests that the Patsa fled north-east for the east coast, 
where they were confronted by the slavers somewhere between Port Natal and Delagoa 
Bay. The reference derives from oral tradition, a rare case that Cobbing uses such 
evidence, and is open to many different readings regarding timing and the nature of the 
participants. Since it stands alone, it cannot be strongly trusted. Certainly the movement 
of the Patsa, prior to their arrival in the Molepolole area in 1824, remains open to 
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the 'Mantatee' at Dithakong also included Hurutse refugees, who had been 
absorbed into the conquering 'horde' as it made its way through the 
interior.57The earliest reports received also referred that there existed white men 
with long hair and beards amongst the advancing 'Mantatee' .58 The foreign 
group at Dithakong, however, was perfectly black.59 These reports appear to 
relate to certain pressures involved in the initial motors of violence to the east.60 
speculation, leaving the remote possibility that they were at Dithakong. See Cobbing, 
'Ousting the Mfecane', pp.14,31; 'Rethinking the Roots', pp.11-12. 
57See examples of incorporation in Thompson, Travels, pp.107, 108. For the Hurutse 
refugees, see Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 21 July 1823, p.102. 
58Ibid., R. Moffat, journal, 23 June 1823, p.90; Thompson, Travels, pp.87,88. 
59Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 26 June 1823, p.93. 
60It has been noted that Cobbing and Gewald use such references to suggest that the 
'Mantatee' were Portugese and Bergenaar raiders respectively. Such conclusions cannot 
be strongly maintained. Their examples of Portugese/Bergenaar raiders operating to the 
north of Dithakong are spurious and date after Dithakong. It is interesting that they use 
such tenuous rumours as authoritative evidence when in support of their views, yet they 
dismiss other parts of the same rumours, without motivation, when in contradiction of 
their claims. A letter from Pringle clarifies these references about white men to some 
degree. He related that a foreign group, threatening the southern Nguni in the eastern 
Cape in 1825, had emigrated from a region far to the north-east. They had been driven 
from their homelands by a stronger nation, 'among whom were people of the colour of 
Hottentots, and with large beards and long hair.' Such uniform allusions to 'whites' 
amongst the invaders suggests something of their existence. Pringle's assertions indicate 
that they were part of initial motors of violence to the east, effecting chains that 
displaced the 'Mantatee' and others. Thompson understood these references either to 
mean bastard Portugese or the shipwrecked descendants of Europeans on the east coast. 
The former explanation would appear more tenable. The earliest rumours, therefore, do 
seem to relate to the Portugese, but neither as being the 'Mantatee' nor as operating 
north of Dithakong before 1823. Rather these references suggest that they played some 
part in the initial upheavals begun in the east, where the extent of their penetration and 
role is open to speculation. See Thompson, Travels, pp.137,214. 
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The third reason for the conclusions of the revisionists involves the etymology of 
the term, 'Mantatee'. Richner believes the word derived· from the misheard 
'Matabele', whereas Cobbing understands it to be coined simply as a euphemism 
for forced labour. The elision between the 'Mantatee' and MaNtatisi was 
developed years later, and had not previously existed.61 Neither explanation 
deals with the word's etymology adequately. 
From the earliest reports, it is especially clear that the word did indeed refer to 
MaNtatisi and her Tlokwa. The first messages Moffat received depicted the vast 
group as 'Mantateesa' and always spoke of her in the feminine.62 Later the word 
'Mantatee' became more frequently heard, and the original references never again 
appeared in European accounts. The very word 'Mantatee' that was adopted and 
used broadly by Moffat, Thompson and otheTs, has also inextricable links with 
MaNtatisi's Tlokwa. When the first literate European observers entered the Vaal-
Caledon region, they discovered that the Tlokwa indeed identified themselves as 
the 'Mantatee'. They did not make the 'Mantatee'-MaNtatisi elision as Cobbing 
61Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', p.9; Cobbing, 'The mfecane as 
alibi', pp.493,515. Richner even suggests, without a corresponding footnote, that the word 
derived from oral accounts of a sixteenth-century Kikuyu warrior 
queen(!). 
62Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 16 May 1823, p.77. 
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suggests.63 It was already in place. Andrew Smith, for example, stated explicitly 
that their principal name was the Tlokwa 'though at different times it has been 
called after some of its more remarkable chiefs upon the same principal as it has 
lately been styled Mantatees, or in other words, the people of Mantatee.'64 With 
reference to the Tlokwa/Mantatees, Smith described in 1836 how . this had 
occurred: 
any remarkable instance of prosperity, or any occurrence which is 
calculated to raise a tribe in the estimation of the others around it, 
is sometimes considered by the tribe itself as best to be recorded 
by the adoption of a new name, and on such occasions the name 
assumed is generally made to refer either to the occurrence or to 
the ruler under whose government it happened. The other means 
by which changes are produced, namely, the influence of strangers, 
operate principally during warlike movements, when bodies come 
in contact who are unacquainted with each others previous 
designations. On such occasions the one speaks of the other as the 
people of such and such a chief, and by perseverance in that system 
often eventually succeed, at least to a certain extent, in establishing 
63Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.515. 
64W.F. Lye (ed.), Andrew Smith's journal of his expedition into the interior of South 
Africa: 1834-36, Cape Town, 1975, p.92. See also, T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, Narrative 
of an Exploratozy Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 
Cape Town reprint, 1968, p.31. 
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names hitherto unknown in the country.65 
Through a combination of these two processes, then, the 11okwa had come to be 
/ known as the 'Mantatee'. It would appear MaNtatisi had gained infamy as the 
leader of a warlike group and, given the extent of her power, her name became 
the epithet by which other warlike bands such as the Phuthing and Hlakoana were 
characterized. This interpretation seems to be placed beyond doubt when Moffat 
writes: 
\-, The prisoners also inform us that they are not the Mantatees; but 
,) 
\ that numerous and powerful tribes bearing that name are also, 
J 
: according to report, infesting the interior, plundering, etc.66 
J . 
Indeed, the earliest reports of the advancing, foreign group did also refer to them 
as 'Matabele'.67 However, Moffat learnt from the refugees themselves that they 
were not in fact 'Matabele'. Rather the word applied to those people who had 
driven them from their countries in the east.68 Therefore, although the words 
'Mantatee' and 'Matabele' were at times used interchangeably, they were by no 
65G.M. Theal, Basutoland Records, 1, Extracts from the report of the expedition for 
exploring Central Africa from the Cape of Good Hope, under the superintendence of Dr. 
A. Smith, p.13. 
66Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 21 July 1823, p.103. 
67Ibid., journal, 26 May 1823, p.84; ibid., 31 May 1823, p.85. 
68Ibid., journal, 21 July 1823, p.101. 
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means synonyms as Richner suggests.69 
The fact that Moffat continued to use the term 'Mantatee' to denote peoples he 
knew were not in actuality the 'Mantatee', seems to have been the cause of much 
of the confusion in the past. Moffat used the word in a similar way to the Tswana 
for whom it signified 'invader' or 'marauder', describing wandering foreigners 
stemming from the east.70 As was the practice, then, Moffat applied the word to 
foreign invaders other than those at Dithakong as well.71 Similarly, the word 
'----- . 
acquired a::g;~~~i~ meaning ~thin the Cape Colony, by which refugees of the ------ - . " -
interior were designated, including groups 
1
of Tswana.72 Over time, Moffat's 
initial identifications became obscured and later writers, removed from the events 
in both space and time, uncritically made the Tlokwa/Mantatee elision with the 
'Mantatee' of Dithakong. 
Cle~rly the revisionists have failed to demythologise the contemporary evidence 
that supports the very existence of the 'Mantatee' as a vast and destitute foreign 
group, uprooted in the east as a community, and forced to plunder the interior in 
69Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"'. Cobbing suggests this also in 
'Ousting the Mfecane', p.30. 
7°Thompson, Travels, p.204. S~e also evidence of this in the vernacular histories, Dico 
tsa Secwana and Ditirafalo tsa merafe ya BaTswana, cited in Smith, 'Sebetwane and the 
Makololo', p.53, note 1. 
71Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, pp. 132-133, 144.; 152. 
72CT:CO 1/GR 15/71 Graaf-Reinet Register 1826-7: 'Apprentices of the Mantatee 
Nation'. See also, Lye, 'The Difaqane', p.122, note 94. 
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times of desperate want. Eldredge describes the significant environmental 
deterioration and persistent drought at the time in the region that marked the 
gravity of their situation. 73 Their large numbers do not appear unreasonable 74 
and, given their presence at Dithakong, they posed a serious threat to the security 
of communities both in the Kuruman and Griqua Town region, against which 
necessary action had to be taken. 
The Grigua 
Cobbing and Richner suggest that Griqua raids for slaves and cattle 'had been 
going on for years', and, therefore, Dithakong should be placed in continuity with 
these raids. 75 Since the Griqua rounded up over 1000 cattle after the battle and 
collected many prisoners, who would later either become their servants or be sent 
into the colony, they believe that the objectives of the Griqua in joining the 
expedition were primarily for cattle and slaves.76 It will be argued that the 
revisionists' portrayal of the nature and character of the Griqua is reductionist 
and simplistic, and will aim to establish the motive of the Griqua as defensive. 
73Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa', pp.45-49. 
74Ibid., pp.47,48; Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, pp.36,72. 
75Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.496; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane'", p.8. 
76Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.492,493; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane'", p.8. Gewald treats the slaving aspect as a side issue and rather focuses upon 
a range of socio-economic and political motives for the involvement of the Griqua in the 
'raid'. See '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.3, ch.7, p.2. 
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Again, the fact that refugees and cattle were taken was a by-product of the battle 
and not its cause. 
The nature and character of the Griqua 
Griqua expansion 77 
The portrayal of the Griqua before 1823 as slave and cattle raiders, whose attacks 
'had been going on for years', cannot be easily sustained. By examining the 
expansive nature of Griqua society prior to Dithakong, it will be argued that this 
accusation is particularly unjustified in the case of the Griqua involved at 
Dithakong under Andries Waterboer, Adam Kok II and B~rend Barends. 
Cobbing and Richner tend to deal with the Griqua as a uniform raiding group. 
However, the Griqua were far from constituting a homogenous raiding 
community. Consisting initially of Bastards and Oorlams, they had come to settle 
around Griqua Town by 1805. Through the eighteenth-century, they had advanced 
eastwards along the Orange, hunting, trading and often raiding. Raids were 
specifically directed against one another. The region has been described as a n 
open frontier zone where little authority existed, being relatively autonomous 
-
from both a colonial or indigenous social system, although dependent on both. In 
77For a detailed account of Griqua expansionism, see: Legassick, 'The Griqua, the 
Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', ch.1-9; M. Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to 
1820: The emergence of the Griqua people', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), The 
Shaping of South African Society. 1652-1820, Cape Town, 1979. 
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this context, lawlessness thrived and, by the end of the eighteenth-century, certain 
leading Bastard families were intent on escaping the region in order to establish 
more stable relations of existence.78 
The Kok and Barends families retreated higher up the Orange River, and from 
the early 1800's attempted to close the frontier zone by normalizing relationships. 
The missionaries played an important part in regularising relations by settling the 
early Griqua around Klaarwater (later Griqua Town), and by controlling trade 
routes with the colony.79 One of the important reasons for the northward 
migration of the Ko ks and Barends centred upon the ivory trade. With the decline 
of the number of elephants in the Orange River Valley, they were forced to look 
towards the north-east trade routes. The 1lhaping effectively controlled these 
routes, and, therefore, it was in their interests to establish trading relations with 
them. From the early 1800's Bastard-1lhaping relations became firmly 
institutionalised in the hands of the Koks and Barends, who profited much.80 In 
order to protect these relations, the Koks and Barends asserted claims to territory 
and political authority, and were able to establish centres of stable settlement to 
ensure control. The early Griqua centred around these leading families within a 
patriarchal structure of society, and, under such circumstances, using their 





relations for many years.81 
In such a context, it is difficult to portray the Griqua as a homogenous, invading 
force free from restraint. Missionary influence geared towards regularising 
, 
relations was considerable, and it was in the interests of the leading Bastard ivory 
traders to maintain a stable society. For many years they sought to prevent 
firearms entering the hands of Koranna, Tswana and small autonomous bands of 
Griqua, and were successful in this to a certain degree. 
Occasional violence did occur, particularly with hunter-gatherers over water-rights. 
The process of dispossession of their lands also provoked confrontation, but the 
accompanying process of acquiring labour cannot be seen in terms of 
enslavement. Kinsman explains that many local bands whose grounds were 
usurped, 'became tied to Griqua households as what would become bonded 
labour. But in so absorbing local groupings, the Griqua imitated the system of 
bonded or client labour used by indigenous Tswana and Koranna groups. 
Although the resulting labourers were tied· to Griqua households, they were by no 
means "enslaved"'.82 Some bands joined the leading Griqua families for 
protection. Others became willing dependents for ecological reasons. Still others 
81Ibid., pp.259-263; M. Kinsman, 'Populists and Patriarchs', pp.2,3. 
82M. Kinsman, 'Re-Sketching the "Mfecane": The Impact of Violence on Rolong Life, 
1823-36', paper prepared for The 'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new paradigm, 






became servants paid in wages.83 The fact that they used intermittent labour 
suggests that there was a large pool of retainers from which to draw. They did not 
need to seek African labour, as is supposed was the case at Dithakong. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the original rep?rters wrote that the Griqua were 
not interested in the refugees collected after the battle. They had enough 
retainers in their immediate vicinity. If they really had wanted slaves for 
themselves, or to trade witfl the colony, they could even have plundered these 
independent local bands.84 
Most of the raiding that did occur was illegal and involved small, autonomous 
bands of Griqua, who often aligned themselves with unruly frontiersmen such as 
Bezuidenhout, Coetzee and de Buys. They raided for cattle and usually seized 
hunter-gatherer 'apprentices'. Breakaway groups such as the Hartenaars and 
Bergenaars also reverted to illegal trading and raidin~atterns, which the leading 
Griqua vigorously condemned.85 The evidential support for slaving prior to 1823 
even by the breakaway groups is extr~mely scanty and can only be estimated at 
a very limited amount.86 But especially for the participants at Dithakong, namely 
83Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', 
pp.171, 172, 176, 177, 179. 
84K.insman, 'Populists and Patriarchs', p.6. 
85Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.298-300; 
Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to 1820', pp.258-259, 271-272. 
86 A review of Cobbing and Richner's evidences suggest this. The majority of their 
examples involving a trade in slaves with certain colonial frontiersmen st~m from 1824. 
See also Kinsman, 'Re-Sketching the "Mfecane"', p.2; Legassick, 'The Griqlia, the Sotho-
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Kok, Barends and Waterboer, there IS no long history of raids for cattle and 
slaves. 
GriQua leadership and composition 
By June 1823, sharp divisions existed in Griqua leadership. Waterboer had 
ascended to power and the traditional 'kapteyns', Kok and Barends, considered 
this a kind of usurpation. The fact that they would join forces and submit to the 
leadership of Waterboer at Dithakong, however, points to a very real common 
threat for which temporary unification was necessary. 
Kinsman has traced Waterboer's ascendence, which she argues was the result of 
the growth of the agricultural faction amongst the Griqua. Until the 1820's, 
Griqua political authority had centred around alliances between the two leading 
families and heads of otherwise autonomous groups in their following. The 
authority of the traditional 'kapteyns', Kok and Barends, was primarily pastorally 
based. Having moved to Campbell and Daniel's Kuil respectively, Kok and 
Barends largely neglected the needs of the expanding agricultural community at 
Griqua Town, so that they were ultimately rejected. The poorer cultivators sought 
new structures suited to their circumstances, and so promoted one of their own, 
namely Waterboer, to the position of 'kapteyn' in order to redirect the 
Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.353-355. 
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administration.87 
As a man of relative poverty and San origins, Waterboer's ascendence was viewed 
with much bitterness and considered a usurpation of power by the hereditary 
'kapteyns'_. Further, that the colonial government confirmed Waterboer in office 
and appointed Melvill as government agent at Griqua Town, only exacerbated the 
situation. Waterboer aimed to use this link to establish his leadership. The 
traditional 'kapteyns' regarded this as an attempt to control them. It was related 
that they regarded this 'as a sort of usurpation or infringement of their privileges, 
not to be tolerated, and to which they accordingly, resolved not to submit.' 
Waterboer's efforts to subordinate the followers of the old 'kapteyns' brought 
further dissatisfaction. Considering his rule 'upstart' and 'tyrannical', a number of 
them withdrew from the Griqua Town area, and settled along the Modder River. 
They later became known as the Bergenaars, and were the cause of much 
disorder in the future. Kinsman concludes, then, that the old 'kapteyns' and the 
Radicals were finding a common cause, and that Waterboer and his followers at 
Griqua Town were increasingly viewed as 'a community separate and opposed to 
the interests of the others.'88 




In such a context, for Kok and Barends to unify with Waterboer and submit to his 
leaders~ip, would have required a~=~~e~ti_on~C~et of circumstances to develop. 
- - -""'\ - -~ 
The great common danger of' the adv~ncing 'Manta1e-~ about which they appear 
l»--- -
to have heard threatening reports beforehand,89 provides the necessary 
explanation. That they set aside their differences, and agreed so -:ordially and 
unanimously to assist each other, suggests their temporary unification was 
motivated by.security reason·s--iin defence of their distinctive communities. 
( ___ _ 
Concerned to place the events within the flow of Griqua history, Gewald makes 
a much closer analysis of Griqua motives. He finds the slaving aspect to be a side 
issue. Rather he focuses upon the splits within the Griqua polity and the 
weakening socio-economic conditions. He argues that the raid on Dithakong 
allowed for the reassertion of their authority over their own adherents and the 
Tlhaping, and the opportunity to sample the illegal benefits of cattle and slaves 
which, he suggests, were already being gained by the Bergenaars.9()Gewald's 
evidence is circumstantial. It is difficult to demonstrate that these were the 
intentions of Waterboer, Kok and Barends. Given the established existence of the 
numerous and foreign group at Dithakong, some of these motives might have 
been secondary intentions or even benefits unrecognised at the time. However, 
alone, they fail to explain the coming together of the Griqua leaders. Attempts 
89See Thompson, Travels, p.87. 
9()Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.3, ch.7, p.2, ch.8, p.2. 
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for conciliation had been unsuccessful and, by June 1823, they were still bitterly 
divided.91Their unity was reactive to an external threat, and not internally 
contrived to assert their authority. There is no direct evidence for Waterboer, Kok 
and Barends convening on such grounds. It remains an argument from silence. 
The fact that a decision was arrived at so promptly and unanimously, after an 
urgent council of war held on the very day of Moffat's arrival in Griqua Town 
suggests, as they themselves stated, that their motive was in response to a great 
common danger,92as opposed to something internally contrived that would have 
taken long deliberation, convincing and reflection, to consider the benefits of 
unity for such causes that Gewald proposes. 
The aftermath of the battle 
Cobbing argues that armed Griqua were used to round up the women and 
children, and that Griqua guns decided where the prisoners should be 
disposed.93 Such a reading suggests their slaving intentions, but is based upon 
sheer speculation. The original reporters narrate an entirely different set of 
91 Legassick, 'The Griqua, t~e Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.302-304,333; 
Thompson, Travels, pp.78-80. It is important to note that too much support for the 
Bergenaars worked against Kok and Barends. They were already losing a number of 
adherents to the Bergenaars, and neither lawlessness nor another autonomous centre of 
authority was in their interests. For this reason, attempts at unity were made, but they 
proved unsuccessful. 
92Thompson, Travels, p.90. 
93Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.493. 
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. 
circumstances which exonerates the Griqua, under Waterboer, Kok and Barends, 
from slaving. 
The Griqua were hardly interested m the women and children left on the 
battlefield, and played little part in rounding them up. They were singularly 
concerned with the cattle that had been taken. If .it had not been for the 
compassionate response of Moffat and Melvill, the weak and wounded would 
have been abandoned on the battlefield, left to the depredations of the revengeful 
Tswana. Moffat chastised them for being 'destitute of sympathy', and for 
manifesting 'the utmost indifference toward collecting the prisoners', calling them 
'heathens still'. It was left, then, to Moffat and Melvill to collect the refugees. 
Considering that many of the refugees were exceedingly weak, it was with the 
utmost difficulty that they urged them onwards. A number, being exhausted, could 
I 
not continue and were left behind. Moffat and Melvill were assisted by only two 
Griqua in bringing the refugees forward.94 
Later, the llhaping were to secure a number of the refugees for themselves. 
Concerned that they had merely been taken to parade as victory trophies, 
thereafter only to be murdered or left to starve, Moffat and Melvill urged the 
Griqua to persuade the llhaping to hand over the women and children. They 
considered that the refugees might best be cared for by the Griqua. Their fears 
94Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 26 June 1823, pp.95,96. 
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were only too well-founded, given the brutality of the llhaping towards the 
defenceless women and children during the battle. When Mothibi received the 
message that the refugees should be delivered over, in a rage he knocked down 
a woman with a large stone, and one of his attendants ~tabbed a male prisoner 
in the heart.- For this reason, the Griqua on behalf of Moffat and Melvill induced 
the llhaping to surrender the refugees. Ultimately, they were not interested in the 
refugees and were only acting upon the sympathetic request of Moffat and 
Melvill.95 
Further, at a later stage, Moffat hoped that Waterboer and his Griqua would aid 
a number of refugees, who were still in the vicinity of Dithakong and Nokaneng, 
by collecting the~ and providing them with protection.96Moffat's pleas would 
I 
gain no response. Even those refugees who did enter the homes of the Griqua 
were treated with indifference and neglect, so that Melvill sought new schemes 
for their provision.Both Moffat and Melvill . were bitterly critical of the 
unsympathetic and uncaring attitude of the Griqua towards the refugees. 
Clearly the primary motives of the Griqua involved at Dithakong were not geared 
towards slavery. That prisoners and cattle were taken does not necessarily imply 
95See Thompson, Travels, pp.174, 175. · 
96Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to Mary Moffat, 13 August 1823, 
,p.107. . . 
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a raid, but can be more rationally explained in terms of the aftermath of a 
victorious defensive battle. In essence, as they themselves stated after the urgent 
council of war, the principal motive of the Griqua leaders was defensive for the 
security of their distinctive communities. 
The Tlhapin1: 
Considering Dithakong to be an attack on the local inhabitants, the revisionists 
suggest that the involvement of the Tlhaping was centred around their own self-
gain. For Richner, an appreciation of the Tlhaping 'commercial jealousy scare' is 
crucial to their role. Gewald views their participation, at least, as part of their 
general hostility towards the inhabitants of Dithakong. Since the Tlhaping gained 
neither cattle nor refugees from the battle, Cobbing takes a wide berth and offers 
' ' 
no explanation for their involvement.97 This section of the chapter will aim to 
expose the poverty of the differing critiques of the Tlhaping, and establish their 
Richner's critique 
For Richner, the concept of the Tlhaping 'commercial jealousy scare' is central 
to the examination of Dithakong. He argues that the Tlhaping had, for a long 
97This is true for 'The mfecane as alibi', but he moves closer to the explanations of 
Gewald and Richner in 'Ousting the mfecane', pp.26,27. 
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time, used the Ngwaketse as a 'mercantile jealousy scare', in order to prevent 
traders from undermining their monopoly by visiting other chiefdoms. Makaba, 
therefore, was made out to be a robber and murderer, with the cunning of the . 
devil. However, when Moffat defied the old 'commercial jealousy scare' by setting 
out for the Ngwaketse, Mothibi was forced to take new measures in order to 
preserve his trade monopoly.· By feeding Moffat messages about 'Mantatee' 
movements, Mothibi was able to use the 'Mantatee scare' to frighten Moffat into 
turning home. Richner suggests that Moffat completely believed the 'Mantatee 
scare', and thus made a hurried journey to Griqua Town to seek Griqua supp9rt. 
Mothibi's new 'commercial jealousy scare' had now developed a momentum of its 
own. Fearing the Griqua would take his cattle if there was no 'horde', Mothibi 
was forced to designate a victim people, which comprised the inhabitants of 
Dithakong, who were old adversaries. In this way, then, the 11haping trade 
monopoly was secured and one of their major rivals, the Maidi, were defeated.98 
In the light of what has already been discussed, the failings of this analysis should 
be obvious. 11~apin~OJ!1m_~!cla! jeal<?_l.lSt_ ~~f!,CJ.i!lltplayecj_a, r~le}n !.~e att~J?1pt 
-~Moffat~£r.om_\1enturing northw_flrd_s, Moffat wrote that Mothibi had held 
· back helpers to lead his oxen, for fear that his journey to Makaba would lose him 
a few rolls of tobacco or some beads.99 However, Richner has exaggerated such 
98Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', pp.7,8. 
99Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 14 May 1823, p.76. 
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interests out of proportion. A few points should suffice in response. 
Firstly, it is difficult to suggest that Mothibi orchestrated the feeding of messages 
about 'Mantatee' movements to Moffat. Moffat received his information from a 
host of different sources, including Mahumoapelo, the Kgalagadi, the Rolong, and 
even the supposed victims of Dithakong.100 Further, the reports seem to have 
gained in consistency as Moffat. drew closer to the sources of conflict. Such 
manipulation of the information would have been overly intricate for Mothibi to 
plot. Secondly, unless Mothibi was intent on defeating his old adversaries at 
Dithakong, he might even have prevented his new 'commercial jealousy scare' 
from gathering momentum, by persuading Moffat not to seek the armed support 
of the Griqua, since it had already achieved its purpose in frightening him home. 
However, having convened a meeting to consider the 'Mantatee' threat, Mothibi 
rather looked to Moffat for advice in the face of danger. 101 
Probably the major shortcoming of Richner's critique concerns the position of 
Moffat. In his efforts to exonerate Moffat from the raid, he portrays him as utterly 
deluded and misled in the extreme. Richner suggests that Moffat mistakenly 
identified the local Dithakong community for the supposed 'Mantatee'. However, 
that he should have recognised the six to eight thousand residents of Dithakong 
100See note 6 of this chapter, the section on the 'Mantatee'. 
101Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 5 June 1823, p.87 
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for an aggressive fifty thousand strong group of foreigners, is difficult to accept. 
In his descriptions of the 'Mantatee', Moffat noted that they contrasted sharply 
with the Tswana of his area in dress, ornaments, weapons and behaviour. Further, 
Moffat had met with the inhabitants of Dithakong on previous occasions. 102 To 
b~ consistent, either Moffat was lying or stating the truth. He could not have been 
deceived. 
Gewald's critique 
Again, concerned in this case to place the events within the flow of Tlhaping 
history, Gewald traces the long-standing rivalry between the inhabitants of 
Dithakong and the secessionist Tlhaping, firstly under Molehabangwe and then 
Mothibi. He argues that by 1823 Mothibi's authority was crumbling. He was beset 
by divisions and economic failure. His involvement at Dithakong, therefore, was 
aimed at liquidating an old adversary once and for all; regaining control of trade 
routes and reasserting his authority. In this way, he intended to imitate 
Molehabangwe's triumphant return to Dithakong.103 Again, Gewald's evidence 
is at best circumstantial. No direct evidence is produced displaying such motives 
of Mothibi. Rather, at a 'pitso' (a meeting) held a few days before the battle, the 
Tlhaping were emphatic in their speeches, recorded by Thompson through the 
102Ibid., R. Moffat, journal, 24 May 1821, p.18; ibid., 16 May 1823, p.77; ibid., 2-3 
June 1823, p.87. 
103Gewald, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.4, ch.7, pp.1-2, ch.8, p.2. 
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assistance of an interpreter, about the need to oppose a foreign and threatening 
people.104Given that the inhabitants of Dithakong had deserted their town, later 
to be occupied by the established existence of the 'Mantatee', the contrived nature 
of this critique should be obvious. Gewald altogether ignores reports about the 
• 
foreign group. 
Clearly the speeches of the Tlhaping convincingly demonstrate uniform. 
consciousness of the need to confront a foreign invading force. Like the Griqua, 
the involvement of the Tlhaping at Dithakong was protective, and motivated by 
the need to preserve their very existence as a people. 
It has been the purpose of these two chapters on Dithakong to expose the 
manipulative nature of the revisionist critiques, in order to meet the respective 
demands of their larger suppositions. The revisionis.ts' ideas about the production 
of history are sweeping, selective, monolithic, simplistic and overly Eurocentric. 
By arguing that the original reporters invented the 'Mantatee' myth as alibi for 
the raid, they assume the production of history was manufactured independently 
of Africans whose witness they neglect. Many of their arguments, rather, stem 
from silence or are based on tenuous evidence open to different readings. 
104For the recorded speeches, see: Thompson, Travels, pp.99-107. 
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For Dithakong to be a raid, the conspiracy at work snowballs beyond the battle 
itself and becomes too massive to sustain. However much the revisionists have 
forced a more critical appraisal of Dithakong, the original accounts still stand. 
Having attempted to establish the original version of events, this thesis must 
necessarily bring the revisionists' singular Eurocentric theory of violence into 
question. 
105 
4 .. DITHAKONG AND THE CHAIN OF VIOLENCE WEST OF THE 
DRAKENSBERG 
With the results of the study on Dithakong regarded as validated, this chapter will 
work outwards and reconsider the broader explanations for the origins of the 
upheavals, with particular respect to the devastations west of the Drakensberg 
around 1822-4. It will be argued that the initial chains of violence on the highveld 
cannot be singularly explained in terms of 'European' forces stemming from the 
west, so that the traditional explanations, that emphasize the important 
catastrophic origins of African agents from the east, need to be re-examined. 
Without proposing the re-establishment of the 'mfecane' model, a synthesis will 
be forwarded with respect to the nature of the chains of violence west of the 
Drakensberg in the 1820's. 
The Chain of Violence in the West - The Transoran2ian Re2ion 
Given that there did indeed exist a numerous and destitute migratory group at 
Dithakong, it becomes necessary to reconsider the revisionist explanations for the 
upheavals in the interio~. The revisionists attempt to establish the chains of 
violence in the Transorangian region in terms of forces stemming from that zone 
itself. For Cobbing and Richner, this is rooted in the Cape colony's demand for 
labour and cattle, whereas for Gewald it is the natural result of internal 
contextual dynamics integral to the region itself. The raiders are identified as 
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Griqua, Bergenaars, Koranna, Xhosa-offshoots and renegade Europeans, who 
caused the destruction of African communities, as is alleged was the case at 
Dithakong. These groups, particularly the Griqua, are recognised as the advance 
guard of Anglo-Boer expansion. Their raids, allegedly, originated in the south and 
the dominant flow of violence was from west to east or south-west to north-east. 1 
This section of the chapter will aim to show that the empirical evidence for such 
raids cannot conclusively demonstrate their singular, decisive impact in the 
upheavals. 
Problems of periodisation 
By projecting later evidence backwards to account for earlier periods, Cobbing 
and Richner give the impression that Griqua-Koranna-renegade European raiding 
does indeed explain the roots of the upheavals and the destruction of African 
communities in the west. In this way, in their convincing style, they suggest 
continuity in the nature and imp~ct of such raids before the battle of Dithakong 
on June 1823, and afterwards. A close review of their evidences certainly does 
indicate that Griqua-Koranna-renegade European raiding played an important 
1Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.498,499; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane"', p.3; Gewald, '"Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.8, pp.3-5. Gewald identifies 
the Bergenaars primarily. In his latest papers, 'Ousting the Mfecane' and 'Rethinking the 
Roots of Violence in southern Africa', Cobbing does identify forces of overlap from the 
east in the form of Portugese raiders. It has been noted that the extent of tl:teir 
penetration, as far as the region north of Dithakong before 1823-4, cannot be strongly 
held. 
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role in the conflicts from late 1823 onwards, but cannot be easily maintained for 
the period prior to Dithakong. The empirical evidence for this time remains 
shaky.2 By examining, in turn, the nature and impact of each identified raiding 
community prior-to and post-1823, it is the intention to expose the groundlessness 
of both Cobbing and Richner's conclusions. 
The Griqua 
It has already been indicated that the portrayal of the Griqua before 1823 as slave 
and cattle raiders, whose attacks 'had been going on for years', is difficult to 
validate. For the leading Bastard ivory traders, it was in their interests to maintain 
a stable society, and missionary influence helped play an important role in 
regularising relations. The majority of Griqua were, therefore, restrained to a 
large extent from engaging upon careers of illegal raiding. The examples Cobbing 
and Richner forward involve small, autonomous bands of Griqua who often 
aligned themselves with exceptional, unruly frontiersmen such as Coenraad 
· Bezuidenhout, Cobus Vry, Gerrit Coetzee and Coenraad de Buys. Their impact, 
however, was sporadic and transitory, and did not seriously disrupt local black 
communities. The extent of Buys-led raids, for example, on the Kwena, Lete and 
2For a review of Cobbing and Richner's evidences, see especially: Cobbing, 'The 
mfecane as alibi', pp.496-498, notes 49-59; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane"', pp.2-7. Since Gewald's thesis deals more specifically with Dithakong, he is not 
as concerned with a close review of these broader movements, although necessarily he 
is suggestive of some of them. See Gewald, "'Mountaineers" as Mantatees', ch.8, pp.3,4. 
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Ngwaketse, hardly affected the collapse of these polities.3 
Breakaway groups such as the Hartenaars and Bergenaars played a more 
significant role. Under pressure to submit to colonial demands, a number deserted 
the Griqua polity for the Harts River, where they reverted to illegal raiding and 
trading. Their influence was again transitory, because many returned to Griqua 
Town by the middle of 1817, as a result of promises that their positions would be 
strengthened within the polity. But they had set the pattern for disaffected groups, 
of which the Bergenaars would be the most prominent and destructive.4 
With the ascendence of Waterboer and his efforts to extend his authority, a 
number - many of them former Hartenaars - withdrew from the Griqua Town 
area and settled along the Madder River on the western fringe of Southern-Sotho 
settlements (see map 1). They later became known as the Bergenaars, and were 
the cause of much devastation in the future. Gert Goeyman was the first to settle 
in the region in early 1822, and by around February 1823, there were 
3See Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to 1820', pp.259,261,262; Theal, Records of 
the Cape Colony, 11, p.254; 12, pp.34,35; Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and 
the Missionaries', pp.245-247; R.G. Wagner, 'Coenraad De Buys in Transorangia', 
University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies. collected seminar papers, 
no.17, vol.4, pp.3,4. Some of these evidences are obscure and cannot be strongly relied 
upon to determine the extent of this raiding in this period. See for example, C.W. Hutton 
(ed.), The Autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stockenstrom, vol.I, Cape Town, 1964, 
p.177. 
4Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.200-209; 
Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to 1820', pp.271,272. 
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approximately 10-15 of them.5 They appear to have focused much of their 
energies on Griqua Town at this time,6 but it is possible that they began raiding 
the Sotho-Tswana. There is little evidence for their raiding until the end of 1823, 
from when their activities appear to have gained momentum and are well 
documented. It would appear, given their small numbers and initial 
disorganisation, that they only became effective raiders towards the end of 1823. 
It can only be speculated what the extent of their role was before Dithakong.7 
Towards the end of 1823, a number of forces were unleashed that favoured the 
possibility of raids upon the Sotho-Tswana. Firstly, by this time, the Bergenaars 
had grown considerably in numbers, augmented by more Griqua and Koranna 
bands. Melvill wrote that they now became bold and began _plundering, bringing 
away an immense number of cattle.8 Secondly, following the unsuccessful 
5Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, report 
by Melvill to the colonial secretary, Dec. 1824, p.214; Legassick; 'The Griqua, the Sotho-
Tswana and the Missionaries', p.300. Legassick suggests that their numbers might have 
been larger by being augmented by Koranna and San at this time. His evidences, 
however, refer to a later date. 
6Ibid., p.300. 
7See for example: Philip, Researches in South Africa, 2, pp.81-91; Thompson, Travels, 
pp.293-295; Hutton (ed.), Autobiography, p.213; Papers Relative to the Condition and 
Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, pp.213-215; Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-
Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.342,343. See also other evidences in Cobbing, 'The 
mfecane as alibi', p.497, notes 50-52; Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', 
especially pp.4,5. 
8Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, report 
by Melvill to the colonial secretary, Dec. 1824, pp.214,215; Philip, Researches in South 




attempts of the 'kapteyns' against them, the Bergenaars were free from ordered 
society with room to manoeuvre. For their own particular reasons, the 'kapteyns' 
had been divided as to what course of action to take. By failing to reach any 
consensus and colonial support, they allowed the Bergenaars to act without 
restraint.9 Thirdly, from about 1824, access to arms and ammunition was more 
easily obtainable: Legassick argues that in the early stages of the Bergenaar 
revolt, the rebels were forced to travel to Graaf-Reinet, the Khamiesberg or Little 
Namaqualand, in order to acquire ammunition. By 1824, however, 'Bushmanland', 
which had separated colonial society from the Griqua, had been penetrated and 
the possibilities of illegal trading were more certain.10 Fourthly, the advance of 
the colonial frontier together with the eagerness of certain colonists to gain 
labour, now made the prospects of a trade in captives more practicable.11 The 
dislocation on the highveld caused by the 'Mantatee' further fostered raiding 
opportunities. Trade relations between the Bergenaars and colonial frontiersmen 
concerning captives were entrenched after Dithakong, when news about 
numerous, destitute 'Mantatee' wandering to the north, prompted them to apply 
to the Bergenaars in order to procure these people for them. 12 Given the already 
dislocated state of the region, then, and a ready 'market', it is from this period 
9Ibid., pp.301-304. 
10Ibid., pp.34 7 ,348. 
11Ibid., pp.354,355. 
12Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants, Lord 
C.H. Somerset to the commissioners of inquiry, p.227. 
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that evidences of a clandestine Bergenaar trade in Sotho-Tswana captives are 
dated. 
The extent of Bergenaar raiding reached dreadful proportions from this time. 
Initially, they attacked the southern Sotho. By mid-1824, they had taken hundreds 
of cattle and many captives, and had reduced a number of peoples to the point 
of starvation. In an effort to end such depredations, Waterboer led a commando 
in July 1824, dispersing the Bergenaars and depriving them of their acquired 
cattle. Many of the captured cattle were restored to some hundreds of Sotho 
refugees, who sought ·the protection of Waterboer and the newly appointed 
'kapteyn', Cornelius Kok II.13 The intended outcome of Waterboer's commando, 
however, proved a failure and only caused further disruption in the long term. 
Deprived of their major exchangeable goods, the Bergenaars could not remain 
inactive and so directed their attentions northwards towards the Tlhaping and 
Tlharo. From 1824, they proved a formidable scourge to these Tswana. Many 
were scattered and impoverished, and their numbers were greatly reduced.14 
13Ibid., report by Melvill to the colonial secretary, Dec. 1824, pp.216,217; Legassick, 
'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.310,311. 
14Ibid., pp.343-345; Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, Robert Moffat to rev. R. Miles, 
5 Dec. 1827, pp.272,276,277. 
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Cobbing and Richner have well illuminated the nature and impact of these raids 
from this period. Yet they have failed to show, decisively, continuity between this 
later raiding and earlier Griqua-Bergenaar raiding prior to 1823. 
The Koranna 
Similarly, the examples for the intensified impact of Koranna raiding date from 
1824. Although occasional raiding did take place, there is little evidence to 
suggest that they were the major perpetrators of violence in either the 
Transorangian or Vaal-Caledon regions before this time.15 
The Koranna have been described as Khoi peoples encountered along the 
Orange, who had retreated before white settlement from the south, and who 
added to an already existent Khoi population to the north.16 During the early 
1800's, many Koranna were absorbed into the Griqua state, but by 1823, certain 
bands, determined not to be incorporated, had settled along the Vaal-Harts river 
junction. The extent of their raids prior to 1823 is difficult to demonstrate on 
15See for example: Arbousset and Daumas, Narrative, pp.228,229; C. Murray and W. 
Lye, Transformations on the Highveld: The Tswana and Southern Sotho, Cape Town, 
1980, pp.39-44; Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.355-
360. Again, some of the earlier examples are vague and cannot be strongly relied upon 
to determine the extent of Koranna raiding for the earlier period. See Ellenberger, 
History of the Basuto, p.213; Kirby (ed.), Diary, p.368. See also other evidences in 
Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.497, note 54; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane"', p.368. 
16Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', p.39. 
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evidential grounds, but they certainly cannot be portrayed as an homogenous, 
invading force. 
Legassick argues that after 1823, pressured by the Bergenaars from the south and 
unsettled African groups, the Koranna could no longer escape the frontier zone. 
They either had to arm themselves or be exterminated. In this way, the Koranna 
were transformed from pre-frontier pastoralists into frontiersmen under military-
style leaders. The advance of the colonial market and the subsequent increase in 
guns; the dislocation caused by the 'Mantatee' coupled with the threats of the 
Bergenaars; all fostered this transformation. Many Koranna either joined the 
Bergenaars or formed their own autonomous bands.17 
Xhosa-offshoots 
These groups originated in the eastern districts ofthe colony. They had acquired 
firearms and are identified by Cobbing as having joined the Griqua in bolstering 
their raids.18 However, they were hardly allies of the Griqua, but rather were set 
up against them. To be sure they did, at times, join frontier ruffians and raid 
Koranna, Sotho-Tswana and Griqua groups. Little is known about them. They 
17Ibid., p.355; Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to c.1840: The rise and decline of 
the Griqua people' in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), The Shaping of South African 
Society, 2nd edition, Cape Town, 1989, p.391. 
18Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', Africa seminar, 1988, p.10. In the journal article, 
Cobbing does change this and relates that they vied with the Griqua. See p.497. 
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were relatively few in size and number. Their impact was transitory and by no 
means catastrophic. The onus is upon Cobbing and Richner to - establish 
otherwise. 19 
The role of the Bergenaars and Koranna reconsidered 
The extent of the role of these groups before late 1823 remains highly 
questionable. It has already been shown that the revisionists fail to explain the 
upheavals to the north-east of Kuruman on the highveld in the months leading up 
to Dithakong, without reference to the existence of the foreign group, and that 
these disruptions must be attributed, at least, to the Phuthing and Hlakoana. 
Could it be possible, however, that Bergenaar-Koranna attacks began the chain 
that effected the ousting of-groups like the Phuthing and Hlakoana, who later 
recoiled from their homelands on the Wilge River west of the Drakensberg and 
advanced on Dithakong? 
Considering that the Phuthing and Hlakoana had already been set in motion by 
1822, this does not allow much time for the massive impact the Bergenaars and 
Koranna would have had to exert hundreds of kilometres from their domain in 
the west, to uproot these communities as a whole in the east. Certainly the 
19See for example: Lye (ed.), Andrew Smith's journal, pp.48-50; Legassick, 'The 
Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.248-250. See also other eVidences 
in Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', p.497, note 53; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane'", especially p.5. . 
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Bergenaars did not penetrate this region by this stage,20 and there is little 
evidence to suggest that the Koranna had advanced so far with raiding intentions. 
Neither has it been evidentially ascertained that their attacks set in motion other 
groups closer to their home base, who in turn devastated areas further afield by 
this time.21 The first Sotho refugees into Griqualand, to which Waterboer and 
Cornelius Kok II offered protection, only arrived towards the middle of 1824. It . 
might also be asked why, given the supposed cataclysmic, disruptive effect on the 
Sotho, the Tswana polities such as the Tlhaping and Rolong with whom the 
Koranna had most of their contact among the black communities, should have 
remained unbroken and intact. Periodisation is crucial. A number of Sotho 
testified that they were first attacked by the 'Caffres' and then by the 
Bergenaars.22 It remains an over-ambitious task to suggest that Bergenaar-
Koranna raiding constituted the motor of violence that began the movement, 
which resulted in the displacement of the Phuthing and Hlakoana. 
Cobbing and Richner have well demonstrated the important role of Bergenaar 
and Koranna raids upon the Sotho-Tswana from late 1823 onwards, which has 
2°Cobbing, himself, recognizes that by the mid-1820's the Bergenaar reach was no 
further than Matiwane's Ngwane in the Caledon Valley. See Cobbing, 'The mfecane as 
alibi', pp.9,10; he suggests this less directly in the journal article, pp.496,497. Richner 
states that they had penetrated as far as the Caledon and Wilge Rivers by 1822, but this 
is based on conjecture. Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane'", p.5. 
21See, for example, Cobbing's evidences for the impact of the Taung by this period. 
As yet, they do not provide strong support. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.497,498. 
See also Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', pp.5,6. 
22Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries', pp.342,343. 
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often been simplistically explained in terms of Afrocentric and 'mfecane' forces. 
To be sure, much of the conflicts must be attributed to these groups from this 
time. However, their thesis lacks evidential support before this period. Certainly 
these pressures must have played some role in the initial conflicts. It is not the 
intention of this chapter to undermine the necessity for further research in this 
area. Detailed case studies of each raiding community are desperately required, 
which will no doubt establish a more prominent place for the Bergenaars and 
Koranna. However, to suggest that they singularly caused the chains of violence 
in the Transorangian region lacks sufficient support. Such a thesis contravenes the 
existing evidence and requires stronger backing before it can be taken up 
vigorously. It, therefore, becomes necessary to reconsider the traditional 
interpretations, which attest that the devastations originated in the east. 
The Chain of Violence in the East - The Vaal-Caledon Re2ion 
/I 
\ , r \_,,..,, ('" 
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Based largely on oral reports, it has been traditionally argued that the arrival of 
the Nguni invaders across the Drakensberg began a great cataclysmic event 
amongst the Sotho, sending the Tlokwa, Phuthing, Hlakoana and others into 
careers of violence. Cobbing and Richner downplay this evidence. It will be 
argued that in the light of their failure to incorporate the initial motors of 
violence within the Transorangian region itself, and following the findings on 
Dithakong, the traditional interpretations require reconsideration. 
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The traditional interpretations 
?
/"The first Eur~pean travellers into the Vaal-Caledon region gave uniform report, 
on the basis of their African informants, that it was Matiwane's Ngwane and 
Mpangazita's Hlubi, who began a desperate time of turmoil. Lye has collated this 
) evidence from a range of African and European sources in his article, 'The 
(? 
Difaqane: The Mfecane in the Southern Sotho Area, 1822-24'. He regarded his 
findings as 'tentatively substantiated', yet clear with respect to the identity of those 
involved. He was cautious to corroborate the oral traditions with other oral and 
documentary evidence, and noted the differences in these traditions when they· 
conflicted. 23 
Lye argued· that because of the segmentary nature of Sotho societies, they were 
unable to unite in a dynamic polity, which could resist the advanced military and 
political system of the Nguni invaders. In the face of the invaders, they rather 
separated into a number of antagonistic communities in a period of immense 
destruction.24 The Hlubi were the first Nguni group to arrive between the upper 
Caledon and the Vaal at the beginning of 1822 (see map 1). They fell upon 
MaNtatisi's Tlokwa along the Elands River who, unwilling to ally with Letlale, 
23Lye, 'The Difaqane', p.131. 
24Ibid., pp.115, 117; W.F. Lye, 'The distribution of the Sotho peoples after the 
Difaqane' in L. Thompson (ed.), African Societies in Southern Africa, London, 1969, 
p.191. 
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chief of the Sia, retreated down the Caledon Valley, where she followed the 
'i 
example of the invaders, and sustained her dispossessed adherents by raiding 
weaker communities. In this way, the highveld was left disunited against the 
militant Nguni. Lye traced the raids of MaNtatisi in the Vaal-Caledon region that 
gained her her infamous reputation. She did not venture beyond the Vaal, as had 
previously erroneously been suspected, but he suggested her escapades in the 
Vaal-Caledon appeared just as devastating as those of the Phu thing and Hlakoana 
beyond it.25 
The Phuthing and Hlakoana were also uprooted as a community, and were forced 
to move from their homelands along the Wilge River. They crossed the Vaal in 
a north-westerly direction, eventually moving southwards towards Kuruman. 
Robbed of their cattle and forced to abandon their sown fields, they resembled 
the extreme deprivation of many communities in this two year period of intense 
turmoil. The degree of. desperation was over\.vhelming. The Phuthing and 
Hlakoana were referred to as 'hungry wolves' by the Tswana. A severe famine 
only intensified the destitution, so that even cannibalism began to manifest 
itself.26 Lye, assuredly, painted a grim picture of the impact of the Nguni 
invaders in the years 1822-4. 
25Lye, 'The Difaqane', pp.117-119. 
26Ibid., pp.123-127. 
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The response of the revisionists 
There is no disagreement pertaining to the arrival of the Ngwane and Hlubi in 
the Vaal-Caledon region by the early 1820's. However, both Cobbing and Richner 
assert that the scale of the violence between these groups and the established 
residents of the Vaal-Caledon has been grossly exaggerated. They argue the fact 
that by 1824-5 the Tlokwa, Hlubi and Ngwane were living relatively close 
together, and had sought out flat-topped mountains for defence, suggests that they 
were not mortal enemies, but, rather, had made local accommodations in 
response to exterior menaces to them all. These exterior menaces are identified 
as Griqua-Bergenaar-Koranna raiders.27 
The revisionists deal briefly with the traditionally alleged severity of the 
Nguni/Sotho conflicts around 1822-4. They notice, correctly, that the evidences 
for the activities of these groups are derived primarily from oral traditions. Few 
literate reporters had penetrated this region by 1823. It was only later that the 
traditional histories were documented. Cobbing and Richner believe that these 
traditions, when recorded years later, have been ,fundamentally tainted, and 
cannot be relied upon for determining original reality. Richner, for example, 
argues: 
Informants and interpreters sometimes consciously misinformed the 
27Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', pp.507,508; Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane"', p.10. 
recipient. Owing to their 'settler mentality', Europeans often took 
information purely literally. Their ignorance of the 'rules of the 
game' made it difficult to interpret such information and this led to 
misinterpretations. There was also ignorance of the language and 
the incompetence of interpreters. All this made the decoding of 
reality hazardous.28 
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For this reason, the revisionists wholly dismiss African versions of the past. Oral 
traditions are totally neglected, described as being overly generalised, dramatised, 
embellished and exaggerated. 
A response to the revisionists 
Certainly the need for a highly critical review of African responses, which have 
too often been accepted at face value, is urgently required. The decoding of oral 
traditions poses no easy task, involving a whole deconstruction of their own 
histories. The researcher would do well to follow Vansina's seminal points, aiming 
to examine the circumstances under which the traditions came to be transcribed, 
and to establish the background, interests and experiences of both the informant 
and the transcriber.29 It is beyond the boundaries of this thesis to make such an 
industrious critique, but the necessity for a critical reassessment of the African 
28Ibid., p.3. 
29See J. Vansina, Oral Tradition as Histozy, London, 1985. 
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responses recorded by the first European.s into the region is strongly promoted. 
The approach of the revisionists, however, to dismiss wholly African oral sources 
is both unhelpful and unwarranted. Many of the African responses derive from 
survivors of that period of the 'blank unknown space', that require close scrutiny, 
rather than outright rejection. Although the difficulties in decoding African 
sources are noted and respected,3° Cobbing and Richner are arguing the 
monolithic case that whites completely controlled the production of history, 
independent of the historical consciousness of the Africans. It is difficult to 
suggest that nothing of African intellectual history from this period has reached 
the present. 
Before serious revision of African responses is pursued, the following points 
related to the findings on Dithakong suggest, in the meantime, at least the partial 
authentication of these oral traditions. The fact that the 'Mantatee' prisoners 
related that they had been driven from their countries in the east by the 
'Matabele', gives these sources strong credibility. From the descriptions given, it 
was believed by Moffat and others that the Matabele either referred to the 
southern or northern Nguni.31 This agrees with Ellenberger who, on oral 
30Certainly there is a place for embellishment and exaggeration. See for example: 
Arbousset and Daumas, Narrative, p.297. 
31Schapera (ed.), Apprenticeship, R. Moffat, journal, 21 July 1823, p.101. See also 
Cope (ed.), Journals, p.182. 
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evidence, noted the following about the derivation of the word: 
It was during this period [the Lifaqane] that the designation 
Matabele was given to the Kaffirs of Natal by the Basuto. It is a 
derivative of the verb ho tebele, 'to drive away', and means 'the 
destroyers' ...... the Basuto designated all those to the east of it [the 
Drakensberg] by the term Matabele, which includes the Zulus, 
Swazis, Hlubi, Amangwane, and many ~thers.32 
Refugees from lands north of the Tembu, who !Jegan filtering into the eastern 
districts of the colony as early as 1822-3, a number of months before Dithakong, 
also stated that they were fleeing the commotions of a numerous nation, who 
pressed upon them from the north and east, bringing unprecedented times of 
upheaval.33 
The nature of the uprooted 'Mantatee' communities at Dithakong - numerous, 
destitute and desperate - reflects something of the heightened scale of violence 
in the Vaal-Caledon region, originating in the east, and the corresponding 
destructive character of the fleeing communities forced into careers of violence. 
The very reference to 'Mantatee', which those at Dithakong themselves denied 
32Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, p.120. See also Arbousset and Daumas, 
Narrative, p.134. 
33Thompson, Travels, p.38. It would appear that these were refugees fleeing African 
sources of violence, as opposed to later refugees into the Graaf-Reinet, Beaufort and 
Albany districts, from about 1824, who either took flight from Bergenaar ravages or were 
seized. 
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and insisted applied to numer~us other powerful groups invading the interior, 
suggests that a number of other peoples in the Vaal-Caledon suffered similar 
fates. Considering that the word specifically applied to .MaNtatisi's Tlokwa and 
became the epithet ·by which other invading groups were known, indicates that the 
Tlokwa, having been displaced by forces from the east similar to the Phu thing and 
Hlakoana, became engaged in a series of attacks as devastating in the Vaal-
Caledon as those of the Phuthing and Hlakoana beyond the Vaal. 
It would appear the African oral reports need to be taken more seriously and 
cannot be dismissed lightly. The dislocation of whole communities from east to 
west in a period of intensive deprivation and formidable strife, stemming from 
Nguni forces in the east and sustained by continued inter Sotho-Tswana attacks, 
particularly around 1822-3, cannot easily be disregarded. It has been suggested 
that these forces constituted the primary motors of violence for this period. 
A Synthesis 
It might be questioned, at this point, whether this study serves to ratify the 
traditional 'mfecane' model. Without completely returning to this model, which 
has hitherto provided the bedrock concept for the history of southern Africa in 
the first half of the nineteenth-century, this section of the chapter will aim to 
propose a synthesis with regard to the nature of the conflicts, in so far as it 
pertains to the violence west of the Drakensberg. It is hoped that such an 
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approach will contribute a more adequate framework for further detailed research 
in this area. 
The traditional 'mfecane' model and the revisionist critiques 
Past histories of this period of upheaval written within the 'mfecane' paradigm 
~ have emphasized the Afrocentric nature of the turmoil.34 'Mfecane' theory 
) postulates that Zulu expansionism precipitated the chain reactions of violence and 
\ population migrations that thrust the interior into immeI1se destabilization. The 
\ concept of the 'mfecane' has become so broad and multiple over the decades as 
/ to deserve presently any continued analytical usefulness. Today, the 'mfecane' can 
( refer, in its broadest sense, to the Zulucentric diaspora, which affected vast 
( 
regions of south-central Africa as far away as Lake Victoria, and which 
) 
' encompassed an era of history beginning at the end of the eighteenth-century to 
{ the end of the nineteenth-century. 
Cobbing has rightly demonstrated the many myths that constitute this macro-
theory, by revealing errors of fact, problems of periodisation and the theory's 
34See for example: Theal, History of South Africa, pp.428-456; Stow, The Native 
Races of South Africa, pp.460-487; Cory, The Rise of South Africa, pp.230-239 (It needs 
to be repeated that although Theal, Stow and Cory do not use the term 'mfecane', their 
view of the Zulu wars and its effects are similar to those who later referred to the 
concept.); Ellenberger, History of the Basu to, pp.137-236; MacGregor, Basu to Traditions; 
Macmillan, Bantu. Boer. and Briton, pp.14-18; Walker, A History of South Africa, 
pp.175, 176; Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath; Murray and Lye, Transformations on 
the Highveld, pp.28-39. 
. \ . .; 
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_pervading Afrocentricism.35 The ~~=~allenge has becom(! __ ~~ -~_ec_~~~~t_!:U_cL_!_~~ 
developllle°:~ ___ ?!_ the 'mfecane' as macrg-_m.yth:. Probably the _m~jor f~_il_i~g of the 
'mfecane' model has been to ~ara!~. developments in southern African history 
~h _w~re <;JQs~ly_~J!i~s.\. Attention to 'European' aggression has been denied, 
resulting in the concealment of many of these atrocities. Complex interconnected 
processes have ·often rather been simplistically explained in terms of Zulu or 
African agency. In the words of Cobbing, the model has served to evade 'an 
analysis of the nineteenth-century confrontation in South Africa between black 
and white races and of the consequences for African societies of white 
expansionism.'36 Later Afrikaner historians and apartheid apologists have, in 
time, used the 'mfecane' explanation for the depeopling of the interior to justify 
Afrikaner expansionism, white occupation of land, the ideology of separate 
development and the continuation of white rule. Certainly 'mfecane' theory has 
separated the inseparable. The revisionists are correct to expose and establish the 
role of 'European' agency as a causative factor of violence for this region and 
period. 
35See in particular, Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane'. 
36Ibid., p.16. This is not to suggest that 'mfecane' theory deliberately aimed to serve 
such a purpose from the beginning. This thesis argues against the 'mfecane' being a 
massive conspiracy created by Europeans. See also Hamilton, "'The character and objects 
of Chaka'", pp.2-4. Saunders has also shown that the early settler voice and the voice of 
the liberal historians did not completely separate colonial history from the 'mfecane', and 
that they cannot be associated with the later apartheid apologists, who gave the 
ideological purpose to the 'mfecane' of justifying the racially unequal division of land. 
See C. Saunders, 'Cobbing, the Mfecane and (Some) Historians', paper prepared for The _ 
'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new paradigm, University of the Witwatersrand, 6-9 
Sept. 1991. 
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In terms of the role of Griqua-Bergenaat-Koranna raiding, Cobbing and Richner 
have rightly relocated the extent of their attacks after 1823-4. Although 'mfecane' 
writers included these forces in the 'mfecane' wars, they failed to address their 
nature and impact in a cohesive and analytical way.37 Cobbing and Richner have 
begun this process of revision. Indeed, the magnitude of their attacks has yet to 
be fully realised. Their raids were especially destructive, given their ready access 
to arms and ammunition. Both Sotho-Tswana and Nguni communities suffered 
greatly. Mzilikazi's Ndebele faced many frontal assaults, just as it appears Griqua-
Bergenaar attacks played an important part in driving the Ngwane southward 
from the Caledon Valley.38 
The counter-paradigm with critique 
Cobbing and Richner, however, have carried their critique further to the extent 
of denying an effective place for African agency. Intent on demolishing virtually 
every aspect of 'mfecane' theory, they have inextricably linked their re-
examination with their counter-paradigm of 'European' penetration as basis. By 
attempting to explain the upheavals of the interior primarily within the 
supposition of 'European' expansion for labour, they make the very same mistake 
37See Ellenberger, History of the Basu to, pp.212-216; Cory, The Rise of South Africa, 
2, p.230; Stow, The Native Races of South Africa, p.485; Macmillan, Bantu. Boer. and 
Briton, p.15; Murray and Lye, Transformations on the Highveld, pp.39-44. 
38See Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', ch.5,6; Cobbing, 'The mfecane 
as alibi' p.508. Peires, however, disputes this in 'Matiwane's Road to Mbholompho'. 
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for which they criticize 'mfecane' theorists. Their error is to shift the pendulum 
to the other extreme by only emphasizing the 'Eurocentric' nature of the violence. 
Their view of the creation of the 'mfecane' myth becomes as Eurocentric as 
'mfecane' theory is Afrocentric. Their efforts to root the initial chains of violence 
west of the Drakensberg in terms of Griqua-Bergenaar-Koranna attacks fails in 
periodisation and cannot be strongly maintained. These shortcomings, together 
with their legitimate concerns regarding 'mfecane' theory, suggest the necessity for 
a new framework to be considered. 
A third way 
This study has suggested that the initial chains of devastation around 1822-3 
west/north-west of the Drakensberg appear, in essence, African. Certainly some 
place in the upheavals must be attributed to pressures from the west, but they 
appear secondary during this period. From 1823-4, they played a more dominant 
part. This is the synthesis approach proposed, whereby the conflicts in the West 
need to be viewed as a complex interplay of 'European' and African forces, 
initially essentially African in character in the years 1822-3, stemming from the 
arrival of the northern Nguni west of the Drakensberg, with 'European' forces 
from the west increasingly coming to play after 1823-4. 
It would seem, then, that this study affirms in a limited way certain elements of 
'mfecane' theory. A review of the earlier 'mfecane' writers shows that they did not 
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mean the word in the macro-sense.39 In fact, the first writers, who rather used 
the term 'lifaqane' or 'difaqane', referred the word primarily to the Transorangian 
disruptions amongst the Sotho west of the Drakensberg, covering a relatively short 
period 1820-1828. Although they also over-elaborated upon the Afrocentric nature 
of the turmoil, they emphasized little the self-generated internal revolution of 
Shaka and rather focused upon the displacements of chiefdoms west of the 
Drakensberg.4° For this reasqn, the chains of violence west of the Drakensberg 
have been referred, more strictly, as the 'lifaqane' or 'difaqane', as opposed to the 
later, broader less tenable Zulucentric 'mfecane'. 
The very word 'mfecane' appears to have derived from the term 'fetcane', used 
in the eastern Cape to relate ultimately to the northern Nguni, which itself 
derived from the Sotho 'lifaqane'. The Sotho west of the Drakensberg were the 
first to use the term, by alluding to the northern Nguni as the 'Bakoni' or 
'Lifakoni, that is to say, those who hew down, or cut their enemies in pieces with 
the chake, their formidable battle axe'.41 Over time, the word appears to have 
39See for example: Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, pp.137-236; MacGregor, 
Basuto Traditions; Cory, The Rise of South Africa, 2, pp.230-239; Stow, The Native 
Races of . South Africa, pp.460-487; Theal, History of South Africa, pp.428-456; 
Macmillan, Bantu. Boer. and Briton, pp.14-18; Walker, A History of South Africa, 
pp.175, 176. This is also true for recent writers such as Murray and Lye in 
Transformations on the Highveld, pp.28-39. It was only through Omer-Cooper in The 
Zulu Aftermath of the 1960's that the term assumed its broader meaning. 
40See Ellenberger, History of the Basu to, pp.137-236; MacGregor, Basu to Traditions. 
41 Arbousset and Daumas, Narrative, p.134. This relates to Lye's translation of 
'difaqane' as hammering which is rendered in Sotho orthography: Lye, 'The Difaqane', 
p.107. Mabille and Dieterlen in their Southern Sotho English Dictionary, Morija, 1961, 
129 
gained a broader meaning amongst the Sotho signifying a period of wars 'waged 
by nomadic tribes accompanied on the warpath by their women, children and 
property, as distinct from the ordinary kind of war between settled tribes where 
only the fighting men go out'.42 Its initial rendering, however, seems to relate to 
the coming of the Nguni, who brought with them a distinctive time of trouble. 
Clearly, if there exists any truth within the concept of the 'mfecane', it must surely 
relate to the 'difaqane' and the initial chains of violence caused by the Nguni 
invaders in the Vaal-Caledon region around 1822-3, that were largely over by 
1823-4. 
As a route to a new framework, this study suggests the need for the recognition 
of two macro-myths - one 'Eurocentric' and the other Afrocentric - both of which 
require to be dismantled. They have both in their own ways created a barrier with 
respect to the historiography of the early nineteenth-century southern Africa 
interior. The challenge has become to deconstruct the development of both 
theories, carefully considering the aspects which should be retained and those that 
should be rejected as myth. 
refer 'kone (Mokane, Bakone, Dikone)' to a member of the Nguni. It does not appear 
tenable that the word 'fetcane' had its ultimate origins in the eastern Cape as Cobbing 
proposes in 'The case against the mfecane', p.14. 




Certainly the pre~~e-~unctioning of the socio-economic-political 1xocesses behind 
~~e initial Africa~-m~t?!S _.Qf_ violence and subseguent chain reactions remains 
unresolved. To what extent were eastern 'European' forces involved behind the 
coming of the Nguni? What part did African economic and environmental factors, 
together with their effects upon the internal dynamics within African polities, 
play? These are questions that lie beyond the boundaries of the thesis. So far as 
Dithakong has any bearing, it has been suggested that Portugese slaving played 
some part in the initial upheavals in the east.43 To argue that the chains of 
disruption east of the Drakensberg were the singular result of Portugese based 
slaving at Delagoa Bay, however, continues to be far from established. It seems 
unhelpful to deny the important place of other considerations in search of a 
simple monocausal replacement explanation.44 
_
43See ch.3, p.83, note 60. 
44For the latest debates considering the causative factors east, north-east of the 
Drakensberg, see for example: Cobbing, 'Rethinking the Roots'; Cobbing, 'Ousting the 
Mfecane'; Cobbing, 'Grasping the Nettle: The Slave Trade and the Early Zulu', paper 
presented to the workshop on Natal and Zululand in the Colonial and Precolonial 
periods, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1990; Hamilton, "'The character and 
objects of Chaka"'; Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa'; J. Wright, 'Political 
Mythology and the Making of Natal's "Mfecane"', Africa seminar, April 1989; and the 
following papers presented at The 'Mfecane' Aftermath: towards a new paradigm, 
University of Witwatersrand, 6-9 Sept. 1991: C. Gorham, 'Port Natal: a "Blind" Darkness. 
Speculation, trade, the creation of a vortex of violence and the "mfecane'"; J. Gump, 
'Origins of the Mfecane: an Ecological Perspective'; J. Wright, 'Political Transformations 
in Natal in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries'. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The _battle of Dithakong has shown itself to be at the very ~.eart of the l_atest 
Q_~~(l_t~~ with respect to the early nineteenth-century history of the southern 
African interior. It has revealed both the poverty of the revisionists' singular 
Eurocentric theory of violence and their methodology,_posing questions for other 
areas of their work. To be sure, Dithakong remains more than just an historical 
battle site of the 1820's, but is a ~i!~'11 lo_cation for the very future o(n_i_!!~~~_e_!:lth­
c:__nt~:y~ sout~er_!!_ A£ti_can historiography of the interior. 
The revisionist versions present a number of challenges both positive and negative 
for the future. Firstly, on the negative side, the fact that their methodology is 
dictated by their broader suppositions, provides a stumbling block for further 
study. Secondly, their preoccupation with white, 'European' agency leads to an 
overstated Eurocentric account of events. This is not merely exaggerated in terms 
of the LO!e of Europeans within the chains of violence, but also in terms of the 
m~filp_uJa~~qn_ Qt the production of history by whites. To suggest that whites 
'invented' the battle of Dithakong and the 'mfecane' myth, independently of the 
historical consciousness of the Africans, is just as problematic. Thirdly, a related 
criticism is that such a p_!:e9ccupation with whi!e agency allows l~ttle place for 
dynamic internal forces generating change within African societies. African agency 
cannot be completely ignored. African explanations of a self-generated revolution 
need to be reconsidered, and at the same time deconstructed of their mythical 
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elements. Similarly, the revisionists' preoccupation with the supposed 
manipulation of white sources leads to the neglect of the search for African 
( 
responses and an African voice of the past. Oral traditions and etymologies of 
words of African origin fail to be pursued. ( Po UJ'\ tr c-J... ~') · 
Firstly, on the positive side, the revisionists' accusations have forced a highly 
critical methodology, especially in those areas where the empirical grounds are 
not so sure. For too long, historians have been far too content with the 
convenient, but often overly simplistic assumptions they have held. Historians 
have been alerted to the need for a closer analysis of the production of 
documents and ad
1 
instructive deconstruction of oral traditions! 'secondly, a place 
for the role of white, 'European' agency as a causative factor of violence, often 
hitherto ascribed to Africans, has been made certain. At the same time, the 
mythical aspects of African agency require to be refined. 
It has been the intention of this thesis to expose the inadequate foundation upon 
which the revisionists' Eurocentric theory of the chains of violence west of the 
Drakensberg is built. It is hoped that the synthesis approach proposed will provide 
a more suitable framework for further research in the area. 
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